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UNITED STATES v. CALDWELL, No. 70-57 
Preliminary Note: 
This memo, dictated prior to the argument and before a complete 
review of briefs, is intended merely to identify the issue. In due time, 
I will have a bench memo which will present both sides more fully. 
Caldwell, N.Y. Times reporter, specializing on Black Panthers, 
refused to respond to grand jury subpoena and was held guilty of contempt 
by district court. Contempt order reversed on appeal by 9th Circuit panel, 
( Merrill, Ely and Jameson). Actually, the opinion of C. A. 9 differed little 
in substance from the opinion of district judge, although it reached a 
different result on the critical point whether Caldwell had to respond 
to the subpoena. The district court issue a'protective order" which 
required Caldwell to appear that specified that until the government 
demonstrated'a compelling and overriding national interest in requiring 
Caldwell's testimony which cannot be served by any alternative means, " 
(i) he shall not be required to reveal confidential information or sources 
about or from the Black Panther party unless the information was given 
him for public disclosure; and (ii) that he should be permitted to consult 
with counsel during the course of his appearance before the Grand Jury. 
2. 
The District Court found that the government had shown no compelling 
or overriding national interest, but still required Caldwell to appear - subject 
to the "protective order". 
Caldwell's Position: 
That the protective order was not sufficient; that the mere appearance 
before the Grand Jury would impair his capacity to function with the Black 
Panthers and provide news from them; and that, under the First Amendment, 
there was no right to compel him to testify - regardless of protective 
provisions - until the government shows the compelling need and that it 
cannot be met by alternative means. 
Holding of Court: 
The Court's decision, characterized as a narrow and limited one, 
as as follows: 
"In light of these considerations we hold that where it has 
been shown that the public's Flrst Amendment right to be 
informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist 
to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the govern-
ment must respond by demonstrating a compelling need 
for the witnesses' presence before judicial process properly 
can issue to require attendance. We go no further than to 
announce this general rule. " Appendix 125 
3. 
Judge Jameson: 
Concurred, but quoted at length from Garland v. Tory, 259 F. 2d 545, 
548 (opinion by Mr. Justice stewart). 
Judge Jameson concluded his concurring opinion in the following 
helpful manner: 
"Accordingly we are concerned with the narrow question 
of whether the Government's showing of a 'compelling and 
overriding national interest that cannot be served by any 
alternative means' may be required in advance of the 
issuance of a subpoena. 
"Appellant did not have any express constitutional right 
to decline to appear before the grand jury. This is a duty 
required of all citizens. Nor has Congress enacted legisla-
tion to accord any type of privilege to a news reporter. 
In my opinion the order of the district court could properly 
be affirmed, and this would accord with the customary pro-
cedure of requiring a witness to seek a protective order 
after appearing before the grand jury. I have concluded, 
however, that Judge Merrill's opinion properly holds that 
the same results may be achieved by requiring the Govern-
ment to demonstrate the compelling need for the witness's 
presence prior to the issuance of a subpoena and in this 
manner avoid any unnecessary impingement of First 
Amendment rights. 
"As Judge Merrill has suggested, this is a case of first 
impression. It would seem that the district court could 
develop procedures which would not unduly hamper or 
interfere with the investigatory powers of the grand jury. 
The Government would have the same burden, except that 
it would make its showing at a hearing in advance of the 
issuance of subpoenas rather than after the witness appears 
and seeks a protective order." Appendix 129-30. 
4. 
Position of Caldwell, the New York Times and the other broadcast media: 
Prof. Bickel's brief amicus, deals with all three cases, but is 
primarily concerned with Caldwell. His "statement" (p. 5) and "summary 
of argument" (p. 7) are helpful. 
Bickel's basic position is that a reporter cannot be made to testify 
until "three minimal tests" are met, namely: 
"A reporter cannot, consistently with the Constitution, 
be made to divulge confidences to a government investigative 
body unless three minimal tests have all been met: A. The 
government must clearly show that there is probable cause 
to believe that the reporter possesses information which is 
specifically relevant to a specific probable violation of law. 
B. The government must clearly show that the information 
it seekJ.s cannot be obtained by alternative means, which 
is to say, from sources other than the reporter. C. The 
government must clearly demonstrate a compelling and 
overriding interest in the information." 
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PREFACE 
Because of the close similarity in these three cases, and 
because they each share a common core Constitutional question, 
I have decided to treat them all in a single memo. My review 
of the briefs and of the basic precedents they rely upon 
convinces me that there is no case heretofore decided by 
this Court which might be viewed as "controlling." There is 
a long string of First Amendment precedents which shed 
light on the First Amendment interests involved and on the 
conventional mode of analysisp and I will cite those cases 
where pertinent in the course of my discussion . 
.. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(1) Do the First Amendment fre.edems of speech and press 
contemplate a qualified right for newsmen to maintain the 
confidentiality of their sources and of information received 
from those sources? 
(2) If such a right exists, under what circumstances 
must it bend to accommodate the public interest in grand jury 
investigations of criminal activity? 
FACTS 
(1) United States v. Caldwell 
Caldwell is a Black reporter for the New York Times. He 
was assigned to cover the activities of the Black Panther 
Party in the San Francisco area. Over a considerable span 
of time he developed a relation of confidence with the Panther 
leaders and rank-and-file. Because of that relationship he 
was able to write some 16 articles about the Panthers which 
appeared initially in the Times and were reprinted in many 
other newspapers. Two of Caldwell's stories are reprinted 
in the Appendix (Pp. 83-89). The first tells the story of 
the Panthers' Food-for-children Project which feeds several 
thousand Black children breakfast every day in 6 major metro-
politan areas in California. The story is a balanced pre-
sentation, pointing out both the physical benefits to the 
young and the consistent effort to propagandize these kids. 
The second story tells of a change in to~e within the party. 
It notes that the leaders have lost some of their former 
militancy, that they speak of the unacceptability of Black 
racism and of the need for unity of radical ~uses . It is 
--3--
unchallenged that these articles have made a unique and sub" 
stantial contribution to the public understanding of this 
particular militant group. 
In February and March, 1970, Caldwell received two sub-
poenas to appear and testify before a federal grand jury sitting 
in California. The first contained a subpoena duces tecum clause 
but the second was only a subpoena ad testificandum. Caldwell 
filed a motion to quash the subpoenas in the USDC ND Calif on 
grounds that the appearance required would interfere with 
First Amendment rights. The Go~ withdrew the duces tecum 
subpoena, leaving only the latter subpoena. The DC denied -
the motion but helti that Caldwell was entitled to a delimiting 
protective order. That order, recognizing a First Amendment -
interest, required that the Govt's attoneys show a "compelling 
and overriding national interest" in any information re-
quested before requiring Caldwell to answer, insofar as the 
questions called for the disclosure of sources or information 
obtained in confidence. Caldwell appealed to the CA9s the 
Govvt ppposed on the ground that the DC order was not final 
and appealable. The CA dismissed the appeal, apparently on 
the ground proffered by the Gov't. 
Subsequently, the term of the grand jury ended, another 
grand jury was selected, and another subpoena ad testificandum 
was served on Caldwell. Again, Caldwell sought to have the 
subpoena quashed in the USDC ND Calif. The motion was heard 
by the same DC Judge (Zirpoli) and the motion was denied sub-
ject to an almost identical protective order. Caldwell re-
fused to appear and the DC ordered him to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt. On June 5, he was held in - -
,. 
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contempt. At the contempt hearing Caldwell submitted a sworn 
affidavit stating that there was nothing he could testify to 
which was not protected by the protective order and that, 
therefore, his attendance was unnecessary. The Gov't did not 
controvert the affidavit. On appeal to the CA9 it was Clad-
/ well's contention that he should not be required to appear. 
The Gov 9 t chose not to challenge the propriety of the pro--
tectiv~o;:der but did contest the alleged right not to -
appear. 
\ 
TheCA held in Caldwell's favor and reversed the DC. That 
ct found a First Amendment right to confidentiality; found it 
i 
necessary to balance the competiYhg First Amendment and 
grand-jury-criminal-investigation issues; and held that the 
Govt must show some compelling need before it could require 
a reporter to appear. The Gov't sought cert to this Court. 
(2) In re Pappas 
Paul Pappas is a newsman~photographer for a TV station in 
New Bedford, Massachusetts. During the course of reporting on 
civil disorders in New Bedford, the local Black Panther leader, 
Bob Heard, agreed to allow Pappas to enter Panther head-
quarters to spend the night. The Pantheres anticipated a 
police raid that night and reached an agreement with Pappas 
that he could report the anticipated raid but that, if no 
raid materialized, he was not to report anything that he 
saw or heard. Pappas did spend the night there, no raid 
occurred, and Pappas reported no story. Two months later 
Pappas was summoned to appear before a state (Bristol County) 
grand jury. He appeared and testified as to events occurring 
--5--
outside the headquarters on the date in question but refused 
to speak about events which transpired inside. Several days 
later he was summoned to appear again. This time, however, he 
filed in state ct a motion to quash the summons, stating as - ,., --
one of grounds that compelled disclosure would violate his 
First Amendment right to confidentiality. The TC held that 
Pappas had no Constitutional or other basis on which to refuse 
to answer questions before the grand jury and ordered him to 
appear. Because of the novelty of the question, however, the 
TC "reported the case" to the Mass. Supreme Judicial Ct. 
That ct aff•d the TC and specifically rejected the holding -
in Caldwell that the Constitution contemplates a newsman's 
-.-.._._ 
privilege • ...,.. 
l 
Pappas was again ordered to appear before the grand jury. 
He applied for cert to this Court and Justice Brannan stayed 
the order pending resolution here. 
(3) Branzburg v. Haves & Meigs 
Paul Branzburg is a reporter for the Louisville Courier-, 
Journal. He specialized in reporting on the drug problems 
associated with the "hippie community" in the Louisville ..,__ -area. Two of his articles are the source of the controversy 
in this case. In November, 1969, an article appeared describ-
ing the production of hashish from Marijuana by two Louisville 
0 
ypuths. Before doing the article, Branzburg promised the 
youths that he would not divu~ their identities, Branzbur~ 
was subpoenaed to appear before the Jefferson County grand ~~ 
jury. He appeared but refused to tell the grand jury who ~  
the~shish-makers ;ere. The foreman of~he gran4fury ~ 
1 ' 
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then brought Branzburg before the local TC where he was 
ordered to answer the questions despite Branzburg's con-
tenions that to answer would violate his First Amendment 
and statutory rights. He appealed to the Kentucky Ct App 
claiming that he should be immune from the requirement to 
divulge the name of his sources. That ct focused primarily 
on Branzburg's statutory claim under a Kentucky law and 
found that it did not cover Branzburg's case. That ct also 
rejected his First Amendment claim on the ground that the 
---'-" 
.. _~ -reporter had abandoned his claim in favor of the statutory 
claim. Branz burg filed a motion to reconsider, bringing to -the Ct's attention the Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell. 
Ct modified its opinion to state that Branzburg had not 
pursued his federal constitutional claim. Therefore, the 
first opinion--with respect to the hashish-making story--
!.t-t~- ~ 
does not turn on the First Amendment but on the~statute. 
A second proceeding is also involved in this case. In 
The 
January, 1971, Branzburg had another article published in the 
newspaper, this one dealing with the response of local 
high school and college youths to laws against marijuana use. 
Eight days after the article appeared, Branzburg was subpoenaed 
to appear before the Franklin Cty grand jury. Instead of ~ ~ 
attending, Branzburg moved that the subpoena be quashed. ~ · 
This motion was premised primarily on the First Amendment ~ 
and relied extensively on the Caldwell opinion. The TC ~ 
Judge denied the motion but did enter a protective order 
much like that issued by the DC in Caldwell. It ordered h~~ 
to appear; stated that he need not reveal confidential sources, 
or information given in confidence; and that he could have an 
.. 
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attorney present to advise him. However, the order differed 
from the DC order in Caldwell in that it included the follow-
ing limiting caveat: Branzburg may not "refuse to answer - -any questions which concern or pertain to any criminal act, 
the commission of which was actually observed." 
Branzburg immediately appealed to the Ct App. On the same 
day that it modified the opinion in the hashish case, the Ct 
J-(!. fv.r<!.j} 
App d ·~ to interfere with the TC order to appear in this 
latter case. The Ct App opinion deals at length with Branz-
burg's reliance on Caldwell. Two grounds were found on 
which to distinguish that cases (1) there was no proof in 
this case that Branzburg 0 s sources would cease speaking freely 
to him; and (2) Branzburg had not shown or alleged that any 
evidence he might have was protected by the revs protective 
order. The Ct App goes on to indicate that it has "misgivings" 
about the Caldwell holding. The Ct does not appear to hold 
that no newsman privilege may be found in the First Amendment. 
l 
Rather it holds that, in view of the importance of the grand 
jury function, no serious threat to First Amendment rights 
had been shown "by the facts of this case." It labels Branz-
burg's speculation that appearance would cause the drying up 
of sources as so "tenuous" as not to constitute an"abridgement 
of the freedom of the press." Pending cert, Justice Stewart 
stayed both of the orders to appear involved in this case. 
DISCUSSION 
Taken together, these three cases represent a rather 
broad spectrum of judicial opinion on the question whether 
the First Amendment comprehends a privilege for newsgatherers 
--8- .. 
to protect the confidentiality of their sources~ne court 
(the Massachusetts ct in Pappas) rejects altogether the 
contention that First Amendment values are at stake in a 
newsman's objection to a summons to a~ar and testify about 
confidentially a~quired information; ~second court (the .__. 
Kentucky ct in Branzburg) has "misgivings" about the existence 
of such a Constitutional right but finds that, at least where 
no evidemce of ruptured relationships is shown, a newsman 
~~be required to tell a grand jury about criminal activity; 
~ird court (the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell) clearly sees 
the privilege, recognizes that it is not absolute and must 
be balanced against other interests in criminal administration, 
and proceeds to lay down a formula for arriving at the necessary 
balance. Obviously, then, if the Pappas view prevails all 
other questions are foreclosed. Only if the Court finds a 
Constitutional basis for the privilege do the problems of 
Branzburg and Caldwell come into the scene. Therefore, your 
attention should focus first on the bedrock Constitutional 
inquiry. 
(1) Is there a First Amendment foundation for the newsman's 
privilege? 
Resolution of this question depends on the acceptance of 
one Constitutional principle and onep or at most two, factual 
principles. 
(a) Constitutional principle 
The First Amendment is written in absolute termsa "Con-
gress shall make no law •.. abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press • • II The Court has never accepted the . . 
• 't>. 
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view espoused by Justices Black and Douglas that the First 
Amendment means what it says. Rathe~ the Court has con-
sistently followed a course suggested by the Solicitor 
General last Term in New York Times Co. v. United Statesp 
403 u.s. (1971): 
"Now, Mr. Justice Black • • • you say that no law means 
no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr. 
Justice that to me it is equally obvious that 'no law' 
does not mean 'no law 0 ••• the First Amendment was 
not intended to make it impossible for the executive to 
function or protect the security of the United States." 
Since the Court has never adopted the absolutist view of the 
First Amendment, it has always been necessary for the Court 
to approach questions under this Amendment with an eye to 
the purposes served by the freedoms of speech and press. The 
function of those freedoms relied on by the newsmen in these 
cases-~and by all the news people in the amicus briefs~~is 
the notion that a self~governing people must have an open 
access to information. The "access" theme is one that runs 
throughout the First Amendment history. The theme was ex-
pressed by Madison in these terms: "A popular government 
without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but 
a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both." The Complete Madison, 
at 337. It has been expressed in innumerable Supreme Court 
opinions. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-71 is 
often cited: "(The First Amendment stands for a) profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should 4e uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." This 
commitment was reaffirmed last Term in Rosenbloom v.Metro-
media, 403 U.S. (1971): it is the "Amendment 0 s function 
to encourage ventilation of public issues." Sl. op. at 16 . 
.. -10--
Probably the clearest statement of the public's interest is 
to be found in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 390 (1969)• "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the broadcasters, which is paramount." . . . "It is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail 
•••• " "It is the right of the people to receive suitable 
access to social, political, estheticp moral, and other ideas 
and experiences which is crucial." 
The public's access right is all that the First Amend-
ment can be fairly read to protect in this case. At several 
points it appears that newsmen would argue for a privilege 
running directly to themselves. The only consideration 
which gives legitimacy to that privilege is a derivative 
right for newsmen because confidentiality may increase the 
pool of accessible knowl~dge. Newsmen are nothing more than 
the conduits--the gatherers--who take the news from its 
sources and pass it on to the people. Their rights are 
no greater than the right of the people to receive news. 
When the courts allow a newsman to raise the First Amendment 
..,..j,<:.y 
as a bar to some form of governmental inter~ference, _.,are 
allowing him to raise a right that belongs to the recipients of 
news. 
The Constitutional principle, then, 
• t.-oJ-
people's right to receive news/protected 
is simply that the -
by the First Amend-
---------------------~ ment. I do not think that any Justice on the Court will take 
.......... 
issue with that principle. 
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(b) F~tual principles 
The hard question is whether--as a matter of "Consti-
tutional factU-requiring newsmen to appear before grand juries 
to testify about the sources of news or the information ob-
tained from those sources (or in some cases appearing at all) 
infringes upon the First Amendment interest in public know-
ledge. It may be helpful to stack up the evidence on both 
sides as it may be gleaned from the cases now before the 
Court. 
First, on the side of recognizing that compulsory process 
may interfere with the exercise of First Amendment rights, the 
Court has the record painstakingly developed by the Respondents 
in United States v. Caldwell. Some 25 affidavits are reprinted 
in the appendix to Resp's brief. These affidavits represent 
the views of well known newspaper reporters as well as TV and 
radio announcers and reporters. The uncontroverted conclusion 
to be derived from this collection of statements and annecdotes 
is that a newsman must have the confidence of his sources and 
it is often impossible to s~stain the confidential relation-
ship when the subject of the information fears that he cannot 
be certain that the newsman will not be required to lay out 
all his information to an investigating grand jury. Both 
the DC and CA found that these affidavits sustained a strong 
~ 
showing that 1~onfidentiality is important to access. 
Second, the factual assertions are reiterated and ex-
panded in the numerous amicus briefs filed in this case. These 
briefsp similarly to the affidavits in Caldwell, are more than 
the self-serving declarations of the media. It is impossible 
to ignore the actual experiences recounted in which one or 
--12--
another reporter lost a valuable contact with an individual 
or group bec~e of his appearance and/or testimony before 
a grand jury. Further buttressing the factual assertion 
is the bulk of commentary--most of it in the last few years--
indicating that the privilege has a factual basis in the 
public's need for information. While most of what has been 
written is not empirical, two sources have been cited in the 
briefs which do have an empirical basis. The first is 11~ ~ 
Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen ~-~., 
~~ Concealing Their Sources, 64 N.W.U.L. Rev. 18 (1969) in 
which the authors interviewed the editors of some 37 news-~ 
papers and concluded that huge percentages of news is ob- ~. ~ 
tained from informants who wish to remain confidential Pi~ 
(15 % of Wall Street Journal stories confidentially based; ~ - ~ 
1/3 to 1/2 of Christian Science Monitor stories confidential).  
The second is an empirical project conducted by Professor ~ 
Blasi at the University of Michigan. He sent questionnaires ~ 
to over 900 newsmen; sent detailed inquiries to 67 of those; 
and conducted in depth inter~views with 47 others. The con-
clusions of that study are summarized in the reply brief 
of Petr in Pappas, pp. 11-13. In essence, those conclusions 
indicate the use of confidential relationships to improve the 
quality of reporting is on the upswing; at least 10 % of 
reporters use confidential sources for over 1/2 of their 
stories; the guarantee of limited interference with ananimity 
is most important when covlering dissident groups. 
Some ~~ght, thirdly, should be accorded the Attorney 
General's opening statement in his recently promulgated 
Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media (Appendix to 
< • 
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Resp's b~f in Caldwell) in which he states that "The Dept 
of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in some cir-
cumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of 
First Amendment rights." The Government's view is augmented 
by the statements of President Nixon at a Press Conference 
in May of last year in which he said that he took a "jaun-
diced view" of "Government action which requires the revealing 
of sources." The President stated that he would permit 
Government incursion into the area of reporters' confidences 
vJ 
only when a "major crime" has been committed and the nesman°s 
Jl 
information will be "directly" helpful. (See amicus brief 
of New York Times (Bickel) at 11). 
A review of all the sourses indicates that the public's 
ri&ht to access to news is interferred with in two ways by -
rupt£Fing--or the threat of rupturing--confidential press-
source relationships. First, the source will be more reluctant -
to confide in a newsman if he is not relatively certain that 
those items which he seeks to keep out of the public domain 
will be honored. Secondly, the newsman himself will be unwilling 
p v hl~i h 
in some cases to ~z&t§ c8@e the publishable material gained from 
a confidant because of the fear that it will lead to grand 
jury investigation--this is the self-censorship aspect of 
the privilege. The best example of that principle at work 
is the Branzburg case. If that reporter had known that his 
information about the identity of marijuana smokers could 
be required by a grand jury, his promise to retain the con-
fidentiality of his source would have--or so he asserts--
compelled him not to publish the stories in the first instance. 
The valuable information contained in his accounts of the 
,. 
--14- .. 
youthful appraisal of marijuana laws would not have become 
known to the citizens in the Louisville area--at least not 
from that reporter. 
On the other side of the scales--controverting the 
factual conclusions that the source will lose confidence in 
his newsman, and that the newsman will censor himself--




SG states in his amicus brief in Branzburg & Pappas, the 
news media has flourished for over 180 years without a 
privileg_e.for newsmen. He states (p. 5) that "such a 
.,.. -· _,... 
privilege is not essential to a meaningful exercise of the 
protected freedoms of the press to write, to publish, and to 
circulate the news." This conclusion is said to derive from 
the history of freedom of the press in this country. Second, 
a similar view is expressed by the Massachusetts court 
when it stated that "Any effect on the free dissemination 
of news is indirect, theoretical, and uncertain, and relates 
at most to the future gathering of news." The Kentucky 
court, while not so certain that the First Amendment may not 
play a significant role, similarly referred to the assertions 
of interference with newsgathering as "speculation" which 
found no support on the record in that case. 
(c) Conclusion on Question 1 
I am in accord with the Caldwell Court that a factual 
basis exists for concluding that the power of compulsory 
process has an impact on the First Amendment. The Consti .. 
tutional principle that the freedom of press contemplates 
the availability to the public of information, is virtually 
,; 
--15--
unassailable. Equally certain is the assertion that the 
right to receive is no more valuable than the right of the 
news media to gather the news. The only serious question, 
for me, is whether grand jury subpoenas ancisummons in any --s~stantial way impinge on the gathering of news. If I \ 
could conclude that the grand jury power affects this gathering 
process in only a de minimus fashion, I would be prepared 
to ignore it as a serious consideration. After all, almost 
any type of governmental interference with the news gatherers 
has an impact on the total pool of public information. If 
~...., 
a mere showing of some impact, however~insubstantial, wewe 
sufficient t o call into play the delicate balancing functions 
of the Supreme Courtp the Court would be innundated with 
cases running a spectrum from challenges to the requirement of 
press passes to get into "background' briefings to the 
maintenance of files marked "top secret." 
The newsman's privilege does not fall into that category. 
tv<Jl..; 
The affidavits on file in these cases sa esspecially crucial in 
ignore. 
they are by the secondary empirical and literary 
and corroborated by the AG's Guidelines, I 
Amendment must 
comprehend some accommodation between the news gatherer and the 
grand jury. The SG 0 s response--they got along without it 
before they had it--is off the point. Certainly, none of 
the reputtable affiants in Caldwell would assert that the 
privilege is the central premise from which "meaningful" 
exercise of First Amendment rights derives. The fact that 
~ 
the privilege is not essential cannot be take~mean that it 
. ~ 
--16- ... 
has no place in the First Amendment. Indeed, I am confident 
that were the SG pushed, he would agree that the grand jury 
does not possess an unlimited power to peer into the newsman's 
confidential files. The abused use of grand jury subpoenas-~ 
just as the abused use of legislative investigations--may have 
dramatic impact on the exercise of the First Amendment right 
t9 gather and disseminate news. 
(2) Under what circumstances must the First Amendment 
right to gather news and retain confidentiality of sources 
bend to the public interest in grand jury investigation of 
criminal activity? 
What I have concluded so far requires reversal of the 
Massachusetts Court in Pappas since that court found no 
First Amendment interest at stake when a grand jury subpoenas 
a newsman to divulge information gained under a promise of 
secrecy. In reversing that case, and in addressing itself 
to the question of balancing or accommodating, the Court 
will be required to respond to the Mass. Ct's charge that to 
recognize a newsmanus privilege would be "judicial legis-
lation." This charge--unlike the same charge made in the 
Death cases--is rather easily answered. The entire history 
of this Court's jurisprudence relating to the freedoms of ---- - . ·;;;;:,. 
speech and press is a demonstration that the analytical 
......... _.,- -~ --
process required in this case is mandated by the COQ§ti~ 
tution. The Court's duty springs from the acklowledgement -that First Amendment rights are not absolute as the terms of 
the Amendment might indicate. Since there is no absolute, the 
Court must always weigh ' the interests to be protected by the 
--17 .... 
Amendment against the interests of the State or Federal 
Government alleged to require a constriction of those 
interests. If the First Amendment's history of balance and 
accommodation is "judicial legislation," then it is legis .. 
lation compelled by the Constitution. New York Times v. 
Sullivan, Hill v. Time, Inc., and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
struck the balance between the law of libel and the freedom 
and 
of the press. Near v. Minnesota,/New York Times v. United States, 
struck a similar balance between the freedom of press and the 
preservation of the national security. Other examples 
abounds Talley v. California• handbills may be distributed 
anonymously despite the State's interests in knowing the 
sources of such literature; Lamont v. Postmasters persons 
may acquire communist political propaganda without disclosing 
their identity in abvance to the Post Office; Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigating Committee; right to maintain confiA 
dentiality of membership lists from investigative scrutiny: 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., preservation of an "untrammelled 
press" in the face of a tax on newspapers. None of the 
specific interests in First Amendment protections is 
mentioned in the Amendment. To that extent, every major 
First Amendment precedent is judicial legislation. It was 
precisely because Justice Black feared the power in the hands 
of lifetime Judges to make such ad hoc decisions that he 
concluded that the Amendment must be treated as an absolute. 
Short of adopting his view, the majority of this Court has 
r,v 
always eng;ged in the delicate balancing required in this case. 
Prior to Caldwell, the only federal court that had passed 
on the question of the relationship between the freedom of press 
--18--
and the "newsman's privilege" was the Second Circuit (per 
Justice, then Judge, Stewart, sitting by designation) in 
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). In that I 
case, the actress Judy Garland filed a defamation suit against 
CBS for libelous statements allegedly made by one or more of 
its executives. Her suit was based on a newspaper column 
in which a columnist, Marie Torre, attributed certain state" 
ments to a CBS executive. Torre was held in contempt for her 
refusal to divulge the source of her statement in a pretrial 
deposition. On appeal, the Second Circuit aff'd. The 
2d Circuitvs analysis is prototypical of what Caldwell and 
the Petrs in the other cases request in this case. That ct 
recognized that "compulsory disclosure of a journalist's 
confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment 
of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the avail-
ability of news." The question for the ct was, therefore, 
whether the interest served by compelling the testimony 
justified the impairment of those First Amendment interests. 
In this case, Torre's testimony was critical to the case; it \t 
was clear that she was the only one who knew the answer to 
the question~ source; the incursion into the confidentiality 
of the newsgatherer was slight. 
Garland, as I read itg points in the proper direction 
~ ........ ,_.-a~ ~ ,.... 
analytically. Having found (or presumed) a First Amendment 
interest, the task for the court was to strike an appropriate 
balance which would permit the minimal interference with pro~ 
tected rights while serving other valid interests. The grand 
jury has a pronounced interest in gaining "everymanvs infor-
mation." The investigation of criminal activity is critical 
,., 
.. -19- .. 
to the maintenance of order. At this stage it would serve 
little purpose to attempt to indicate where the balance ought 
to come to rest. It may be more helpful simply to list some 
of the considerations which ought to go into determining 
whether the newsman should be compelled to testify. 
(1) What is the likelihood that the newsman will 
have information--not already in the public domain- .. which 
would be relevant to the investigation of some matter within 
the scope of the pending investigation? The amicus brief 
for the NY Times suggets that the gov't be compelled to show 
that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been 
committed and that the newsman will have evidence relevant to 
that crime. Probable cause seems too high a standard since, 
as the SG points out in his opening brief in Caldwell, the -
function of the grand jury is to determine whether probable 
cause elists. Some standard short of probable cause .. -but _,.. 
h~gh enough to assure against a grand jury "fishing expedition"--
must be required. The nature of the grand jury investigatory 
technique is such that any juror may ask a witness virtually 
any question. For that reason the newsman should be assured that 
there is a specific crime or pattern of crime under consid .. 
eration. 
(2) The amicus NY Times brief also states that the grand 
jury should be permitted~compel testimony relevant to 
A 
serious crimes, such as crimes of violence. A grand jury 
then would not be permitted to interrogate a newsman about 
victimless crimeso such as drug violations like that involved l in Branzburg. This restriction, it seems, goes too far. It is 
the function of grand jur.ies to investigate crime--crimes of 
--20--
violence as well as victimless crimes. 
(3) Central to the balance should be some criteria that 
the information sought not be readily available from some 
non-newsman source. This is one of the desiderata in the 
AGvs Guideliness "all reasonable attempts should be made 
to obtain information from non-press sources before there is 
any consideration of subpoenaing the press." This is an 
important aspect because the temptation would be too great 
otherwise to use the press as "an investigative arm of the 
Government" (Guidelines, p. lb of Resp's appendix). The 
press may be the most readily visible source of information 
but newsmen are far from the only tool available to the Govern-
ment. 
(4) The CA 9 in Caldwell seemingly recognized that 
some attention should also be paid to the particular source 
in question. The Ct stated, "it is not every news source 
that is as sensitive as the Black Panther Party has been shown 
to be • It Some confidential sources will not be fore-• • • 
closed to a newsman after he testifies before a grand jury, 
no matter what he divulges, because it is in the interest of 
the sonrce to continue to "leak" information--this would 
appear often to be the case where Government executives 
are concerned. Some sources use the press as a tool to 
express their own views--these sorts of sources are not likely 
to be paranoid about the prespects of the newsman's loss 
of confidential cover. With some it is simply a calculated 
risk. 
(5) The burden of establishing the elements necessary 7 
to justify impairment of the confidential relationship • 
.e. 
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should be on the Governmental entity. And, the test~-what-
ever its parameters--should be couched in the language which 
has become familiar in First Amendment cases , i.e., the grand 
jury must have some compelling or overriding interest in 
securing the testimony of the newsman. The forum in which ........... .. ______ _ 
before a trial court judge. I note that the Petr in Branzburg 
argues that the Government should be forced to lay out its 
I 
reasons for wanting the newsman's testimony in an open hearing. 
This suggestion should be rejected by the Court. One of the 
necessary elements of grand jury investigation is secrecy. 
There is not good reason why that secrecy should be eroded 
in the name of an initial determination of whether the grand 
jury can call a newsman to testifyp . 
(6) In some cases, the appropriate balance may be 
struck by a protective order by the TC judge, limiting the 
scope of permissible grand jury inquiry--more precisel~ 
limiting the scope of inquiry to which the newsman must re-
spond unless he be held in contempt. In other cases, the 
only fair balance will require that the newsman not be asked 
to testify at all. 
.1,\ 
As In Caldwell, the mere appearance be-
fore the grand jury may be shown to precipitate a disruption 
of confidential relations. 
(l) It should be kept in mind that the Court only sets 
out the minimal requirements to assure reasonable protection 
for the precious First Amendment rights and that, where the 
State statutes are more protective of the newsman, or where 
the federal Guidelines go farther than the Court has gone, 
those standards would apply and govern 9 
I 
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(8) There is also a concern expressed in the reply 
brief of the State of Mass. in Pappas that the Court will be 
unable to drawn a line between the newsman and any other per-
son who desires to make public his views. That problem 
is not alive on any of these cases since all three are 
cases involving bona fide newsmen by any legitimate standard. 
An important distinction, however, must be recognized to 
exist between the newsman who acts as a conduit for the 
views of others, who avails himself of the First Amendment 
in order that the citizenry may receive the broadest range 
of views, and the private citizen who seeks merely to exercise 
his personal right of freedom of speech. The newsman's right 
of freedom of press is, necessarilyv broader than any one 
individual's right of freedom of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Essentially my conclusions area (1) the freedom of press 
contemplates an interest in the maintenance of the confidentiality 
of sources belonging to newsmen; (2) that interest is not 
absolute and must bend to the compelling interests of the 
government in investigating crime; (3) where the government 
can show a compelling need for the testimony of a newsman, 
even though it requires the disruption of confidential 
sources, the newsman must testify. The task for the author 
of the Court's opinion will be to set out the basic broad 
structute for dealing with the qualified right. No more than 
the framework need be established in these cases. Refinements 
must be left to other cases. 
...... 
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If the Court goes down the road I suggest, it is likely 
that all three cases will need to be remanded for reconsider-
ation in light of the Court's opinion. Ultimately, however, 
I would anticipate that the basic holding of the Branzburg 
w-id 
and Caldwell opinions ta be affirmed, and the holding of the 
"'~ Pappas opinion ~ be reversed. Branzburg involved an 
investigation aimed at uncovering information relevant to 
a specific criminal violation, i.e., violation of the drug 
laws by youths smoking marijuana. It appears clear that 
this newsman is the source of the grand jury's concern and 
.... 
that he may be the onlly available source of the needed 
v 
information. In Caldwell the Gov't has failed to demonstrate 
why it is that they wish to have Resp testify. Having accepted 
the propriety of the protective order--taereby indicating 
that it did not wish to inquire directly into confidential 
sources or information--it may have precluded consideration 
of the only evidence which Caldwell could offer. His uncon-
troverted assertion that he has nothing else to add to the 
storlies he has published leaves the Govt' with no consid-
eration to place in the grand jury's side of the balance. 
This is the peculiar sort of case in which the newsman's 
privilege may well extend to immunity from appearance al• 
togehher. The fragile nature of the relationship has been 
persuasively established and the Govt has failed to demon-
strate any need for his testimony. 
Pappas will call for reversal under any holding which 
recognizes a newsman's privilege since it seems to repudiate 
that notion completely. However, tested by new standards, it 





Court. Pappas himself had no carefully nurtured relation-
ship with the Panthers. Pappas may well prove to be the only 
man who can assist the grand jury in determining who was inside 
the headquarters (this assumes that the grand jury is invest-
igating the same circumstances with which Pappas was familiar). 
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Tentative Impressions* 
Although the facts in these cases differ, counsel for the media -
in the principal briefs and in the briefs amicus - are asserting a First 
Amendment right - a right of constitutional proportions - to a privilege 
against disclosing - in judicial or other proceedings - sources of 
information or confidential information. 
Statements of this position vary. That in the brief on behalf 
of Branzburg (at p. 9) is typical: 
"The First Amendment provides newsmen a privilege 
against compulsory appearances in closed proceedings 
and against compulsory disclosure of confidential 
information. In order to overcome this privilege, the 
state has the heavy burden of proving, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the testimony of the reporter 
is absolutely necessary to prevent direct, immediate 
andirreparable prospective damage to the national 
security, human life or liberty. Any lesser burden 
does not adequately protect the press from state 
action which endangers the freedom of the press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. " 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
Prof. Bickel, representing the New York Times and various 
other media, states their position as follows: 
"The First Amendment demands . . . that the reporter 
be protected. The standard of protection can be defined 
by objective criteria, and made self limiting in practice. 
"A reporter cannot, consistently with the Constitu-
tion, be made to divulge confidences to a governmental 
investigative body unless three minimal tests have all 
been met. 1. The government must clearly show that 
there is probable cause to believe that the reporter 
possesses information which is specifically relevant 
to a specific probable violation of law. 2. The 
government must clearly show that the information 
it seeks cannot be obtained by alternative means, which 
is to say, from sources other than the reporter. 3. 
The government must clearly demonstrate a compelling 
and overriding interest in the information." 
The decisions of the three courts differed materially. In 
Caldwell, the Ninth Circuit agreed substantially with the press -
2. 
although its decision was narrowly drawn in light of the specific facts 
(the government had not introduced any evidence to show a need for 
the testimony). 
In Branzburg, the court reached a different result from 
Caldwell. It decided that the reporter would have to testify before 
the grand jury, and it express~ave doubt as to whether there was 
any constitutional privilege. The reporter had not shown, as was true 
in Caldwell, that he had no information - other than stories already 
published - to disclose. 
3. 
In Pappas, the Massachusetts court held flatly that there was 
no First Amendment privilege, qualified or absolute, available to 
newsmen. 
My Tentative Views: 
establishing a constitutional 
Branzburg: I woul 
acsept a JJ of ik8 1 drsomng of tlitrcourt. 
Pappas: It seems to me that the Massachusetts court may have 
been right in holding that there is nov privilege as a matter of con-
stitutional right, either absolute or qualified. But the Court did not 
give due weight to the importance of balancing First Amendment 
interests against the other interests involved. I would be inclined 
to reverse Pappas for reconsideration in light of the principles and 
guidelines established in this Court's opinion. 
* * * * * 
As to the cortro lling principles, I am tentatively inclined to 
share the view expressed by Justice Stewart in Garland v. Torre, 
259 F. 2d 545, namely, that there is no constitutional privilege 
4. 
specifically available to newsmen. Mr. Justice stewart also declined 
to recognize - as I read his opinion - even an "evidentiary privilege" 
(such as that available to a lawyer). He did emphasize the important 
First Amendment interest involved, and concluded that these needed to 
be balanced against the interest being served by the administration of 
justice (in the Garland case the need to have the testimony of a critical 
witness). 
I have been interested in the protective order entered by Judge 
Meigs in the Branzburg case (Appendix 46) which purported to protect 
confidential sources and information, but required the witnesses to 
appear before the grand jury and to answer questions ''which concern 
or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of which was actually 
observed by Branzburg. " 
Some elaboration and refinement of Judge Meigs approach 
might make sense. His qualification, for example, with respect to 
crimes "actually observed" is not broad enough. Crimes which might 
be planned or discussed in his presence should not be privileged. 
Some of the "safeguards" proposed by counsel for the media -
such as imposing a heavy burden on the state to show a "compelling 
and overriding interest", and to guarantee a public hearing prior to 
the newsman being required to answer any question, go much too far. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
Con£. 2/ 25/ 72 
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Mr. Jus t i ce Brennan 
Mr. Justice St ewart 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~ Justice Powell 
!1;r. Justice Rehnquist 
I 
The writ of certiorari m No. 70-85, Branzburg v. 
Hayes and Branzburg V. M eigs, brings before ustwo 
judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both in-
volving petitioner Branzburg, a staff reporter for the 
Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in Louis-
ville, Jefferson County, Kentucky . 
J. 
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2 BRANZB URG v. HAYES 
On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal carried 
a story under petitioner's byline describing in detail 
his observatio of two youn residents of Jefferson 
County ~thesizing has us from marihuana, an activ-
ity which, they assert.ecl, earned them about $5,000 in 
three weeks. The article included a photograph of a 
pair of hands working above a laboratory table on which 
was a substance identified by the caption as hashish. 
The article stated that petitioner had promised not to 
reveal the identity of the two hashish makers.1 Peti-
tioner 'vas shortly subpoenaed by the Jefferson County 
grand jury; he appeared, but refused to identify the 
individuals he had seen possessing marihuana or ttie 
pti·sons he had seen making hashish from marihuana.~ 
A state trial court judge 3 ordered petitioner to answer 
these questions and rejected his contention that the 
) 
Kentuck r )Orters )fivile e statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. 
421.100,4 t e First Amem ment o t 1e United States Con-
1 The article contained the following paragraph: "·I don't know 
why I'm lrtting you do thi~ story ,' j'onr informant] said quietly . 
'To make the narcs (narcotics detectives) mad , I guess. That's the 
main rrnson.' Howe\·er , Larry and his pnrtnr r asked for and re-
eri,·rd a promise that their narneH would be chnngrd." R ., at 3-4. 
~ The Foreman of thr grand jury reported th:l t. prt itioner Branz-
burg had refused to an:;wer the following two questions : " # 1. On 
Nowmber 12, or 13, 1960, who W< l ~ thr prr~on or per:;onH you ob-
srrved in po8~e~~ion of Marijtwn:~ , :~bout whirh you wrote an :1rticle 
in the Courier . .Joumal on N'o,·ember 15, 1969? #2. On No,·rm-
ber 12, or 13, 1969, who was the per;:;on or per. ons you obset'\'ed 
compounding Marijuana , 1'rodueing same to a compound known :~s 
Hnshish ?" R., at 6. 
3 Judge J. Miles Pound. The present rr~pondent in this ea~e, lion . 
John P. Haye~ , i:; thr ~ucce~sor of .Judge Pound. 
4 Ky. Re\'. St:1t. 421.100 pro\'ides: 
"No person shall be compellrd to diselo;;e in any legal proceeding 
or trial before any romt, or before any grand or petit jury, or before 
the presiding officer of nny tribun~d, or his :~gent or :~gents, or 
' 
.. 
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stitution, or §§ 1, 2, and 8 of the Kentucky Consti-
tution authorized his refusal to answer. Petitioner then 
sought prohibition and mandamus in the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals on the same grounds, but the 
Court of Appeals denied the petition. Branzburg v. 
Pound, 461 S. W. 2d 345 (1970). It held that petitioner 
had abandoned his First Amendment argument in a 
supplemental memorandum he had filed and tacitly 
rejected his argument based on the Kentucky Consti-
tution. It also construed Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100 as 
affording a newsman the privilege of refusing to divulge 
the identity of an informant who supplied him with 
information but held that the statute did not permit 
a re )Orter to refuse to testify about events he had ob-
The second case involving petitioner Branzburg arose 
out of his later story published on January 10, 1971, 
which described in detail the usc of drugs in Frankfort, 
Franklin County, Kentucky. The artiCfe reported that 
in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the "drug 
scene" in Frankfort, petitioner "had spent two weeks 
interviewing several dozen drug users in the capital 
city" and had seen some of them smoking marihuana. 
A number of reported conversations with and observa-
tions of several unnamed drug users were recounted. 
Subpoenaed to appear before a Franklin County grand 
jury "to testify in the matter of violation of statutes 
concerning use and sale of drugs," petitioner Branzburg 
before the General Assembly, or any committee thereof, or before 
any city or county legislatiYe body, or any committee thereof, or 
elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by 
him, and publi~hed in a newspaper or by a radio or television broad-
casting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which 
he is connected." 
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moYecl to quash the summons; " the motion was de11ied 
although an order was issued protecting Branzburg from 
revealing "confidential associations, sources or informa-
tion" but requiring that he "answer any questions which 
concern or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of 
which was actually observed by [him 1." Prior to the 
time he was slated to appear before the grand jury, peti-
tioner sought mandamus and prohibition from the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, arguing that if he were forced to 
go before the grand jury or to answer questions re-
garding the identity of informants or disclose informa-
tion given to him in confidence, his effectiveneRs as a 
reporter would be greatly damaged. The Court of Ap-
5 Petitioner's Motion to Qu:t~h argued: 
"If Mr. Branz burg \\"ere required to di~rlo~e t he~e eonfidenres to 
the Grnnd .Tnry, or nny othrr person, he would thereby destroy the 
rrhtion~hip of tnt~! whic·h hr pre~ently enjo~·s with tho8e in thr 
drng culture. The~· would refu~e to speak to him: thry would he-
rome ewn more reluctant than they nre now to ~peak to any new~­
mnn: and the news media would therrby he vitall~r hampered in 
their ability to rover the views and artivitir~ of tho8e im·olvrd in 
the drug culture. The inrvit:~ble effect of the ~ubporna i~~urd to 
Mr. Branzburg, if it not be qua~hrd b~· this Comt, will br to sup-
pre~s vital First AmrndmPnt frrrdom~ of 1\Ir. Branzburg, of the 
Courier-Journal. of the 1wws meclin. nne! of tho~r im·oh-rd in th<' 
drug culture b~· driving a wrdf!;r of di~tru~t :~nd Rilrnre bet wrrn the 
nrwR media nnd the drug culture. Thi~ Court ~hould not s;mrtion 
n usr of its prore~R rntailin~ so dmsl iran inrm~ion upon Fir~t Amend-
ment freedoms in thr ah~rnrr of romprlling Commonwralth interest 
in requirinf!; 1\'Tr. Brnnzburg's appenranre beforr the Grand Jury. 
It is insufficient mrrely to protect 1\Tr. Brnnzbmg's right to silrnre 
nftrr he appenr~ brforr tltc Gr:md .Jury. This Comt sho11ld totally 
cxruse Mr. Brnnzburg from re~ponding to the subpornn nnd e1·en 
entering the Grnnd .Jur~· room. Once Mr. Brnnzburg i~ rrquirccl 
to go behind thr rlo~ecl door;; of the Grand Jur~· room, hi~ rffrrtiYe-
nr~s as a reportrr in the~e arras is totnlly dr~troyrd. Thr srrrecy 
that surround~ Gr:md .Jury trstimon~· neces~nril~· int roducr" uncer-
tainties in the minds of tho~c who fenr a betrayal of thrir confidences." 
n., at 43-44. 
.. 
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peals OllCO again denied tho requested writs, reaffirming 
its construction of Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100, and reject-
ing petitioner's claim of a First Amendment privilege. 
It distinguished Caldwell v. United States, 434 F. 2d 
1081 (CAO 1971), and it also announced its "misgivings" 
about that decision, asserting that it represented "a 
drastic departure from the generally recognir.cd rule 
that the sources of information of a newspaper reporter 
are not privileged under the First Amendment." It 
characterir.ed petitioner's fear that his ability to obtain 
news ":ould be destroyed as "so tenuous that it docs 
not, in the opinion of this court, present ;i; abridgement 
of freedom of the press within the meaning of that 
term as used in the Constitution of the United States." 
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to review both 
judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and \\'C 
granted the writ.r. 402 U. S. 942 (1971). 
6 Aftrr the Kenturky Cnurt of A11prals' drri~ion in Branzbura v. 
Meigs 11':1~ announced, petitionrr filed a rrhc:11·ing motion in Branz-
burg v. Pound ~uggrsting that the Court hnd not pa~scclupon his First 
Amcndmrnt nrgnmrnt anrl railing to the Comt 's at tent ion thr rcrcnt 
Ninth Cirruit drriRion in Caldwell v. United Statrs. On .Jan. 22, 1971, 
the Court clenircl petitioner'~ motion :1nd filed an amrncled opinion in 
the r:18e, adding a footnote, 461 S. W. 2d, nt 346 n. 1, to indir:1tc 
that pet t ioner lwei nbandoned hi~ Fir~t Amendmrnt argument nnd 
electrcl to rrly wholly on Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100 when he filrcl a 
Snpplrmrntnl 1\'Temor::mclmn brfore oral argument. In his peti-
t ion for prohibt it ion and mandamus, pctitionrr hnd rica rly rclird: 
on thr Fir~t Amendment, and he hnd filrd his Supplemental Memo-
randum in rr~polh'r to thr Stntr~ memorandum in oppo~ition to 
the granting of the writ~. AH its title indicates, this Mrmomndum 
1ra~ com plrment ary to petitioner~ em·licr petition, and it dealt 
primarily with thr State's ron~truetion of the phrase ">'ource of 
information" in Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100. The pa~::;age which thc-
Krntucky Court of A ppm!~ cited to indicate abandonmrnt of prti-
tionrr's First Amrnclmrnt claim is a~ follows: 
"Thus, the controversy continues as to whether a newsmnn's source 
of information should be priYilrged. However, that question is not 
before the Court in this case. The Legislature of Kentucky has 
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In the Matter of Paul Pappa.s, No. 70-94, originated 
"·hen petitioner PaJ;j}as, a tefevision newsman-photog-
rapher working out of the Providence, Rhode Island, 
office of a New Bedford, Massachusetts, television sta-· 
tion, was called to New Bedford on July 30, 1970. to 
'r(~port on civil disorders there which involved fires a!ld 
other turmoil. He intended to c~er a Black Panther 
news conference at that group's lieadquarters fri a 
boarded-up sTore. Petitioner found the streets around 
the store barricaded, but he ultimately gained entrance 
to the area and recorded and photographed a prepared lA 
state e1 t r b one of the Black Pa1 1er 1 aders at f \ 
about 3:00 p.m.7 e then as e 
mission to re-enter the area. Returning at about 9:00 
p.m. that evening. he was allowed to enter and remain 
inside Panther headquarters. As a condition of entry, 
settled the issue, hnving decided that a newsman's sourcC' of infor-
mation is to be privileged. Because of this there is no point in 
citing Professor WigmorC' nnd other authorities who speak against 
the grnnt of such a privilege. The question has been mnny times 
debated, and the Lcgi~lature has spoken. The only question before-
the Court is the con ·t ruclion of the term 'source of information' as 
it was intended by the Legislature." 
Though the passage itself is somewhat unclear, the surrounding dis-
cussion indicates that petitionN was asserting here that the qnes-
tion of whether a common law privilege should be recognized \vas 
irrelevant since the legislature had already enacted a statute. In 
his earlier disrussion, petitioner had analyzed certain cases in which 
the First Amendment argumC'nt was made but indicated that it was 
not necessary to reach this question if the statutory phrnsr "source 
of information" were interpreted expansively. We do not interpret 
this discussion as indicating that petitioner was abandoning his 
First Amendment claim if the Court of Appeals dd not agree with 
his statutory interpretation argument, and we hold that the consti-
tutional question in Branzburg v. Pound was properly preserved for 
review. 
7 Petitioner's news films of this event were made available to the-
Bristol County District Attorney. R.., at 4. 
.. 
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l 
Pappas a reed not to disclose anythin he saw or heard 
ins1 e t e e excep an an 1c1pated police raid which 
P~ l<oi-this own," was free to photograph and re-
port. Pappas stayed inside the headquarters for about 
three hours, but there was no police raid, and petit.i9E!:r 
wrote no story or otherwise revealed what had tran-
sPired m the store while he was there. Two months 
later, petitioner was summoned before the Bristol County 
Grand Jury and appeared, answered questions as to 
his name, address, employment, and what he had seen 
and heard outside Pa11ther heardquarters, but r~sed to 
answer any questions about what had taken pl ce in~ 
side headquarters while he was there, claiming that 
the First Amendment afforded him a privilege to pro-
tect confidential informants and their information. A 
second summons was then served upon him, again di-
recting him to appear before the Grand Jury and "to 
give such evidence as he knows relating to any matters 
which may be inquired of on behalf of the common-
wealth before ... the Grand Jury." His motion to I 
quash on First Amendment and other grounds was de-
nied by the trial judge who, noting the absence of a 
statutory newsman's privilege in Massachusetts, ruled 
that petitioner had no constitutional privilege to refuse II 
to divul e to the Grand Jur what he had seen and 
heard, i cludin t 1 ent1 y of ersons e ad observed. - . The case was reported for deClslOn to t 1e upreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts.8 The record there did 
not include a transcript of the hearing on the motion 
to quash nor did it reveal the specific questions peti-
tioner had refused to answer, the expected nature of 
8 The case was reported by the superior court directly t o the 
Supreme Judicial Court for an interlocutory ruling under Mass . 
Gen. Law, c. 278, § 30A and Mass. Gen. Law, c. 231 , § 111, and 
the Supreme Judirinl Court's decision appe:u s at - Mass. - ,. 
266 N . E. 2d 297 (1971) . 
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his testimony, the nature of the grand jury investigation, 
or the likelihood of the grand jury securing the infor-
mation it sought from petitioner by other means." The 
Supreme Judicial Court, hmvever, took "judicial notice 
that in July, 1970, there were serious civil dirordcrs 
in New Bedford, which involved sft·eet barricades, e~­
clusion of the public from certain streets, fires, and sim-
ilar turmoil. We were told at the arguments that there 
was g,g_nfire in certain streets. \V c assume that the I 
grand jury investigation was an appropriate effort 
to discover and indict those responsible for criminal 
acts." - Mass. -, 266 N. E. 2d, at 299. The Court 
then reaffirmed prior Massachusetts holdings that tes-
timonial )rivileo-es 'vere "exce )tional" and "limit~' 
stating that " [ t] he pnnCJp e that the public 'has a 
right to very man's evidence' " has usually been pre-
ferred, in the Commonwealth, to countervailing inter-
ests. Ibid. The Court rejected the holding of the 
Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States, supra, and "ad-~ 
here[cl] to the view that there exists no constitutional 
newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to re-
fuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury.l() 
-Mass. -, 266 N. E. 2d, at 301-302. Any a#erse 
effect upon the free dissemination of ne\YS by virtue of 
petitioner's being called to testify was deemed to be 
n "We do not lul\·c brfore u~ the text of :my specific qurstionR 
which Pnppn~ ha~ rcfu~rd to nn~wrr brfore the ~rand jur~·. or any 
prtition to hold him for rontempt for hiH rdus:1l. We hnYe only 
genrrnl ~tatcmcnts conccrnin~ (a) the inquirirs of the ~r:1nd jmy, 
and (b) the mnteri:1lity of the testimony ~ou~ht from Pappas. The-
record docs not ~how the expected nnturc of his testimony or what 
likelihood there if' of being able to obtain that testimony from pcr~ons 
other than news gntherers.'' - Mn~f'. -, 22G N. E. 2d, :1t 299 
(footnote omitted). 
10 The Court Pxpressly declined to consider. however, appc:1rnnccs 
of newRmen before lc~islativc or admini~trntivc bodies. - Ma~s. 
-, 2GG N. E. 2d, at 303 n. 10. 
... 
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only "indirect, theoretical, and uncertain." Mass. 
--, 266 N. E. 2d, at 302. The court concluded that I 
l 
"The ohl!_gation of newsmen ... is th2:._t of every citi-
~en; ... to appear when summoned, with relevant writ-
ten or other material when required, and to answer 
relevant and reasonable inquiries." - Mass. --, 266 
N. E. 2d, at 303. The court nevertheless noted that 
grand juries were subject to supervision by the presid-
ing judge, who had the duty "to prevent oppressive, 
unnecessary, irrelevant, and other improper inquiry and 
investigation," to insure that a witness' Fifth Amend-
ment rights were not infringed, and to assess the pro-
priety, necessity, and pertinence of the probable 
testimony to the investigation in progress." Ibid. The 
burden "·as deemed to be on the witness to establish 
the in1propriety of the summons or the questions a"ked. 
The denial of the motion to quash ·was affirmed and 
we granted a writ of certiorari to petitioner Pappas. 402 
U.S. 942 (1971). 
United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57, arose from sub-
' poenas issued by a federal grand jury in the Northern 
District of California to respondent Earl Caldwell, a 
reporter for the New York Times assigned to cover 
the Black Panther Party and other black militant groups. 
A subpoena duces tecum was served on respondent on 
February 2, 1970, ordering him to appear before the 
grand jury to testify and to bring with him notes and 
11 The Court noted th:-~t "n pre~iding judge mny consider in his 
discretion" the nrgumcnl that the u~c of newsmen as wilnes~es is 
likely to result in unncccs~nr:v or bmden~ome use of their work 
product, - l\Iass. -, 266 N. E. 2d, at 304 n. 13, and cautioned 
thnt "We do nol ~uggcst that a general investigation of mere po-
litical or group aRsociation of per~ons, without substnntial relation 
to criminnl event~, may uot be viewed by a judge in a somewhat 
different manner from an investigation of particulnr criminal events 
concerning which a newsmm1 may have knowledge." - Mass. -, 
266 N. E. 2d, nt 304 n. 14 . 
70-85, 70-94, & 70-57-0PINION 
10 BRANZBURG v. HAYES 
tape recordings of interviews ven 
tion by officers 1 of ac 
Party concerW,Og the aims purposes, and activities of 
that organization.12 Respondent objected to the scope 
of this subpoena, and an agreement between his counsel 
and the government attorneys resulted in a continu-
ance. A second subpoena was served on March 16, 
'vhich omitted the documentary requirement and simply 
ordered Caldwell "to appear . . . to testify before the 
Grand Jury." Respondent and his employer, the New 
York Times/" moved to quash on the ground that the 
unlimited breadth of the subpoenas and the fact that 
Caldwell would have to appear in secret before the 
grand jury would destroy his working relationship with 
the Black Panther Party and "suppress vital First 
Amendment freedoms ... by driving a wedge of distrust 
and silence between the news media and the militants." 
R., at 7. Respondent argued that "so drastic an in-
cursion upon First Amendment freedoms" should not 
be permitted "in the absence of a compelling govern-
mental interest-not shown here-in requiring Mr. Cald-
well's appearance before the grand jury." Ibid. The 
motion was supported by amicus curiae memoranda 
from other publishing concerns and by affidavits from 
12 The subpoena ordered production of "Notes and tape record-
ings of interviews covering the period from January 1, 1969, to date, 
reflecting statements made for publication by officers and spokes-
men for the Black Panthrr Party concerning the aims and purpo es 
of said organization and the activities of said organization, its of-
ficers, staff, personnel, and members, including specifically but not 
limited to interviews given by David Hilliard and Raymond 'Masai'. 
Hewitt." R., at 20. 
1 3 The New York Times was granted standing to inten·ene as a 
party on the motion to qua h the subpoenas. 311 F. Supp., at 359. 
It did not file an appeal from the District Court's contempt citation, 
and it did not seek certiorari here. It has filed an amicus curiae 
brief, however. 
.. 
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newsmen asserting the unfavorable impact on news 
sources of requiring reporters to appear before grand 
juries. The Gq,_vernment filed three memoranda in op-
position to the motion to quash, each supported by 
affidavits. These documents stated that the grand jury 
was investigating, among other thmgs, possible viOla-
tions of a num5er of criminal statutes, ~luding 18 
U.~. § 871 (threats against the President), 18 U.S. C. 
§ 1751 (assassination, attempts to assassin te n iracy 
to assassinate t e Pres1 ent , . S. C. § 231 (civil 
disordern), 18 0. S. C. § 2101 (interstate travel to incite 
a riot), and 18 U.S. C.§ 1341 (mail frauds and s·windles). 
It was recited that on November 15, 1969, an officer 
of the Black Panther Party made a publicly tele-
vised speech in which he had declared that "We will 
kill Richard Nixon" and that this threat had been re-
peated in three subsequent issues of the Party news-
paper. R., at 66, 77. Also referred to were various 
writings by Caldwell about the Black Panther Party, 
including an article published in the New York Times 
on December 14, 1969, stating that "[i] n their role as 
the vanguard in a revolutionary struggle the Panthers 
have picked up guns" and quoting the Chief of Staff 
of the =party as declaring that "We advocate the yery 
direct overthrow of the Government by way of force 
a1~ violence. By picking up guns and moving against 
it because we recognize it as being oppressive and in 
recognizing that we know that the 0121Y solution to it 
is armed struggle [sic]." R., at 62. The Government 
al~o stateathat the Chief of Staff of the Party had 
'
been indicted by the grand jury on December 3, 1969, 
for uttering threats against the life of the President 
in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 871 and that various efforts 
had been made to secure evidence of crimes under in-
vestigation through tho immunization of persons alleg-
edly associated with the Black Panther Party . 
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An April 6, the District Court denied the motion to 
quash, 311 F. Supp. 358 (ND Cal. 1970), on the ground 
that "every person within the jurisdiction of the gov-
ernment" is bound to testify upon being properly 
summoned. !d., at :J60 (emphasis in original). Never-
theless, the court accepted respondent's First Amend-
ment arguments to the extent of issuing a' ~rotectivc 
orde~' wovidin that althou h respondent must divulge 
wl v · · 1formation hac been giVen to him or pub-
lication, he "shall no e reqmrec to revea con c en ial 
a~ations, sources or information received, developed 
or maintained by him as a professional journalist in 
the course of his efforts to gather news for dissemina-
tion to the public through the press or other media." 
The court held that the First Amendment afforded 
respondent a privilege to refuse disclosure of such con-
fidential information until that had been "a showing 
by the Government of a compelling and overriding 
national interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell's testimony 
which cannot be served by any alternative means." 311 
F. Supp., at 362. 
Subsequently,'' the term of the grand jury expired, a 
ne"· grand jury was convened, and a new subpoena 
ad testificandum was issued and served on May 22, 
1970. A new motion to quash by responclelJt and mem-
orandum in opposition by the Government were filed, 
and by stipulation of the parties, the motion was sub-
mitted on the prior record. The court denied the motion 
to quash, repeating the protective provisions in its prior 
order but this time directing CalchYell to appear before 
the grand jmy pursuant to the May 22 subpoena. Re-
spollClent refused to appear before the grand jury, and the-
1 ~ Rrspondrnt nppralrcl from the Di~trirt Court'::; April G drninl 
of his motion to qun sh on April 17, 1970, nncl the Go\'C•rnmrnt 
mo,·ccl to dismiss thnt nppcnl on the ground thnt the order wns 
interlocutory. On Mny 12, 1970, the Ninth Circuit dismi::;secl the 
appeal without opinion. 
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court issued an order t,o sho''" cause ''"hy he should not be 
held in contempt. Upon his further refusal to go be-
fore the grand jury, respondent was ordered committed 
for contempt until such time as he complied with the 
court's order or until the expiration of the term of the 
grand jury. 
Respondent Caldwell appealed the contempt order,'" 
and the Court of Appeals reversed. Viewing the issue 
before it as \Yhether Caldwell was required to appear 
before the grand jury at all, rather than the scope of 
permissible interrogation, the court first determined that 
the First Amendment provided a qualified testimonial 
privilege to newsmen; in its view, requiring a reporter 
like Caldwell to testify would deter his informants from 
communicating with him in the future and would cause 
him to self-censor his writings in an effort to avoid being 
subpoenaed. Absent compelling reasons for requiring ( 
his testimony, he was held privileged to withhold it. 
The court also held, for similar First Amendment rea-
sons, that.Vabsent some s )ecial showino- of necessity by 
the Government, a tendance y Caldwell at a secret 
·m~ting of t j; grand jmy was something he was priv-
ileged to refuse because of the potential impact of such 
an appearance on the flow of news to the public. We 
granted the United States' petition 'n for certiorari. 402 
U. S. 942 (1971). 
I 
Petitioners Branzburg and Pappas and respondent 
Caldwell press First Amendment claims that may be 
1 " The Go\·ernment did not file a cross-appeal and did not chal-
lenge the ya]idity of the Distric-t Court order in the Court of Appeals. 
10 The petition presented a single que~tion: "Whether a news-
paper reporter who has ]1ublished articles about an organization can, 
under the Fir:;t Amendment, properly refuse to appear before a 
grand jury im·estigating po~siblo crimes by members of that 
organization who have bccu quoted in tho publii:ihocl articles." 
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simply put: that to gather news it is often necessary 
to agree either not to identify the source of informa-
tion published or to publish only part of the facts 
revealed, or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless 
forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the 
source so identified and other confidential sources of 
other reporters will be measurably deterred from fur-
nishing publishable information, all to the detriment of 
'the free flow of information protected by the First 
Amendment. Although p~s do not claim a,n ab-
solute privilege against official interrogation in all cir-
cumstances, the assert that the re orter should not be 
forced ei to a Jear or testify before a oTan ury 
or at tri 1til and unless sufficient grounds are shown 
'for believin that the reporter possesses infor ion 
relevant to a crime t e grand jury is mvest1gatit hat -the informa IOn as 1s unavmlable from 
y 1e 1sc osure. 
Pnnc1pall)Frelied upon arc prior cases emphasizing the 
importance of the First Amendment guarantees to in-
dividual development and our system of representative 
government/7 decisions requiring that official action with 
adverse impact on First Amendment rights be justi-
fied by a public interest that is "compelling" or "para-
mount," 1 8 and those precedents establishing the principle 
17 Curtis Publishing Co . Y. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 145 (1967) 
(opinion of Harlan, ,T.); N ew York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 
270 (1964); Talley v. Calijomia, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Bridges 
v. California, 314 U. S. 2.52, 263 (1941); Grosjean v. Ame1ican Press 
Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 250 (1936); N ear v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 
722 (1931). 
1 8 NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963); Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); D eGregory v. Attorney General of 
N ew Hampshire, 383 U. S. 825, 829 (1966); Bates v. Little Rock, 
361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 
(1939); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 464 (1958) . 
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that justifiable governmental goals may not be achieved 
by unduly broad means having an unnecessary impact 
on protected rights of speech, press, or association.10 
The heart of the claim is that the burden on news 
gathering resulting from compelling reporters to dis-
close confidential information outweighs any public in-
terest in obtaining the information.20 
We do not question the significance of free speech, 
press or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it 
suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First 
Amendment protection; without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated. But this case involves no intrusions u on 
speech O"r'assembly, no )rior rcstram or restnctwn on 
whaf tfie press may publish a~ ~ express or implied 
command that the press publish what it prefers to'With-
hold. No exaction or tax for tfie privilege of publish-
iiig,"" and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the 
content of published material is at issue here. The 
I use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted ; reporters remain free to seek news from 
1° Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 56 (1965); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 377 U. S. 288, 307 (1964); Martin v. City of Struthers, 
319 U. S. 141, 147 (1943); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 18 
(1966). 
20 There has been a great deal of writing in recent years on the 
existenre of a newsman'~ constitutional right of nondisclosure of 
confidential information. See, e. g., Beaver, The Newsman's Code, 
The Claim of Privilege, and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 Ore. 
L. Rev. 243 (1968); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argu-
ment for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
18 ( 1969) ; Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional 
Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L. J. 317 (1970); 
Note, The Newsman's Privilegr: Government Investigations, Crim-
inal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1198 
(1970); No1e, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 
Col. L. Rev. 838 (1971); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against 
Di~closure of Confidential SoUJ·res of Information, 24 Vane!. L. Rev .. 
667 (1971). 
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any source by means within the law. No attempt is \ 
made to require the press to publieh its sources of in-
formation or indiscriminately to disclose them on request. 
I 
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters I 
to respond to grand .1ury subpoenas as other citizens 
.£!.o and to answer uestions relevant to an investl ation 
into t 1e commission 1e. Qitizens generally are 
not constitutiQ_nally immune from grand. jury suQ_poenas; 
and neither the FirSt.. Amendment nor other constitu-
tional provision protects the avet:a"ge citizen from d"s-
closing to a gran .Jury m ormation t 1at he has received 
in conhdence.'1 1 •I'Jte clanft 1s, 'however, tl'i1tt reporters 
arc exempt from these obligations because if forced to 
respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or dis-
close other confidences, their informants will refuee or 
be reluctant to furnish nmYsworthy information in the 
future. This asserted hurden on news gathering is said 
to make compelled testimony from newsmen constitu-
tionally suspect and to require a privileged position for 
them. 
It is clear that the Firet Amendment docs not invali- l 
date every incident";\ burdemng of the press that may 
result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes 
of general a )hcability. U ndcr prior cases, othenYisc 
va 1c aws serving substantial public interests may be 
enforced against the press as against others, despite 
\ 
21 "ln grnrral. thrn, the mrrc fact that a communirntion was made 
in cxprc~s confidenrc, or in the implied confidence of a ronfidcnti:tl 
reifltion, doc~ not create a privilege. . . . No pledge of privncy nor 
oath of ,;ccrecy ran avail again~t demand for the truth in n court 
of justice." 8 .J. Wigmore, Evidcnre §22SG (MeN aught on cd. 19Gl). 
This was not always the rule at common lnw, howe1·er. Jn 17th 
rcntury Englnnd, the obligation~ of honor nmong gentlemen were 
orcn~ionally recognized a~ pri1·ileging from rompul~or.v di~closmc 
informntion obtained in exchange for n promise of ronfidcnrc. Sec 
Bulstrod v. Lethmere, Freem. r. 5 (1G75); Lord GrC'ys 1'rial, 9 How. 
St. Tr. 127 (1682). 
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the possible burden that may be imposed. The Court 
has emphasized that "[t]he publisher of a newspaper 
has no special immunity from the application of gen-
eral laws. He has no special privilege to invade the 
rights and liberties of others." Associated Press v. Labor 
Board, 301 U. S. 103, 132- 133 (1937). It was there 
held that the Associated Press, a news-gathering 
and disseminating organization, was 11ot exempt from 
the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. 
The holding was reaffirmed in Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-193 (1946), where 
the Court rejected the claim that applying the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to a ne"·spaper publishing busi-
ness would abridge the freedom of press guaranteed 
by the First Amendment. See also Mabee v. White 
Plains P'ublishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946). Associated 
Press v. U11ited Stales, 326 U. S. 1 (1945), similarly 
overruled assertions that the First Amendment pre-
cluded application of the Sherman Act to a ne\YS 
gathering and disseminating organization. Cf. Indiana 
Fmmers Guide Co. v. Prai1-ie Farmers Co., 293 U. S. 
265, 276 (1934); Cit?'zen Publishing Co. v. United States, 
304 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-156 ( 1951). Likewise, a ne\vs-
paper may be subjected to nondiscriminatory forms of 
general taxation. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 
U. ~. 233, 250 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
u. s. 105, 112 (1943). 
The prevailing view is that the press is not free with 
impunity to publish everything and anything it desires 
to publish. Although it may deter or regulate what 
is said or published, the press may not circulate know-
ing or reckless falsehoods damaging to private reputa-
tion without subjecting itself to liability for damages, 
including punitive damages, or even criminal prosecu-
tion. See New York 'Pimes v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 
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292 (1964); Garrison Y. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74 
(1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 
147 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J. ,); Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971). A newspaper 
or a journalist may also be punished for contempt of 
court, in appropriate circumstances. Craig v. Harney, 
331 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1947). 
It has generally been held that the First Amendment \ 
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of 
special access to information not available to the public 
generally. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16- 17 (1965); 
New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, at 728- 730 
(STEWART, J., concurring); 1'ribune Review Publishing 
Co. v. Thomas, 254 F. 2cl 883, 885 (CA3 1958); In the 
111 atter of United Pre;ss Assns. v. Valente, 308 N. Y. 
71, 77, 123 N. E. 2d 777, 778 (1954). In Zemel v. 
Rusk, supra, for example, the Court sustained the Gov-
ernment's refusal to validate passports to Cuba even 
though that restriction "rendered less than wholly free 
the flow of information concerning that country." The 
ban on travel was held constitutional, for "the right 
to speak and publish docs not carry with it the un-
restrained right to gather information." I d., at 17. "" 
Despite the fact that news gathering may be ham-
pered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury l 
proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other 
official bodies gathered in executive session, and the 
meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no 
constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or 
22 "There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed 
by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For 
example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House 
diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might 
find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but 
that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment 
right." 381 U.S., at 16-17. 
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disaster when the general public is excluded, and they 
may be prohibited from attending or publishing infor-
mation about trials if such restrictions are necessary to 
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tri-
bunal. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), 
for example, the Court reversed a state court convic-
tion where the trial court failed to adopt "stricter rules 
governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen as 
Sheppard's counsel requested," neglected to insulate wit-
nesses from the press, and made no "effort to control 
the release of leads, information and gossip to the press 
by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both 
sides." !d., at 358. "[T]he trial court might well 
have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, 
party, witness, or court official which divulged preju-
dicial matters . . . ." I d., at 361. See also Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-540 (1965); Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963). 
It is thus not surprising that the great weight of au-
thority is that newsmen are note~ )t from the normal 
duty o appearmg_ e ore a grand jury and answering 
questions relevant to a cnmmal mvestigation. At com-
1 
~aw, cou£!s consistentlt refused' to recognize the 
existence of any privilege authorizin a newsman to 
refuse to re,Y.ea con en 1a m _gqp.ation to a e;rand jury. 
See, e. t;' Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 -( 1897) ; Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 781 
(1911); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (~. 1950); In re 
Grunow, 84 N. J. L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People -ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N. Y. 291, 199 N. E. 
415 (1936); Joslyn v. People, 67~1. 297, 184 P. 375 
(1919); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F. R. D. 439 
(SD ~- 1969); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler 
Corp., "'20 F. R. D. 416 (Mass. 1957). See generally 
Annot., 7 A. L. R. 3d 591 (1966). In 1958, a news- l 
gatherer asserted for the first time that the First Amend--
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mont privilcgeu confidential information from public 
disclosure pursuant to a subpoena issued in a civil suit, 
'--
Garland v. Torre, 259 F. 2d 545 (CA2), cert. denied, 
358 U. S. 910 ( 1958), but the claim was denied, and this 
argument has been almost uniformly rejected since then, 
although there are occasional dicta that, in circum-
stances not presented. a newsman might be excused. 
In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P. 2d 472 (1961); In 
re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A. 2d 181 (1963); State v. 
Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P. 2cl 729, ccrt denied, 
392 U. S. 905 (1968): Vi Murphy v. Colorado,-- Colo. 
-, cert. denied, 365 U. S. 843 (1961) (unreported, dis-
cussed in In re Goodfader, supra, 45 Haw., at 366, 367 
P. 2d, at - (Mizuha, J., dissenting)). These courts 
have a )lied the )resum )tion against the existence of 
an asserted testimonial privilege, Unite ta es v. Bryan, J 
339 U. S. 323, 331 ( 1950), and have concluded that the 
First Amendment interest '";tsserted b the news1;:;n 
\\"aS ou we1g 1e y the genera o ligation of a citizen to 
appear 6etore a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a 
subpoena, and giVe \Yhat information he possesses. The 
opinions of the state courts in Bra.nzburg and Pappq.s 
are typical of the prevailing view, although a few recent 
cases, such as Caldwell, have recognized and given effect 
to some form of constitutional newsman's privilege. See 
Slate v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N. W. 2d 93 (1971) 
(dictum); Al·ioto v. Cowles Communication, Inc., C. A. 
52150 (ND Cal. 1069); People v. Dohrn, No. 69- 3808 
(Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1970). 
The prevailing constitutional view of the ne\vsman's 
privilege is very much rooted in the ancient role of the 
grand jury '"hich has the dual function of determini11g 
if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has 
been committed and of protecting citizens against un-
I 
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founded criminal prosecutions."" Grand JUry proceed-
ings are constitutionally mandated for the institution of 
federal criminal prosecutions for capital or other serious 
crimes. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury .... " "4 The adoption of the grand 
jury "in our Constitution as the sole method of pre-
ferring charges in serious criminal cases shows the high 
place it held as an instrument of justice." Costello v. 
United Slates, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956). Although 
state systems of criminal procedure differ greatly among 
themselves, the grand jury is similarly guaranteed by 
many state constitutions and plays an important role 
in fair and effective law enforcement in the overwhelm-
ing majority of the States."" Because its task is to 
~a "Ilistoricnll~·, fthe ~rand j11r~·1 .. ha~ been regarded ns a 
11rim:uy ~ecurity to the innocrnt agninst hast~·. mnlirious and op-
pres~iYe pcr8rrution; it sen·es the invnluable function in our society 
of standing between the accu~er and thr nccusrd ... to determine 
whether n chnrge i~ fo11nded upon renson or w:1R dictated h~· nn 
intimirlnting powrr or b~r mnlice and personal ill will." Wood v. 
Georgia, :370 U. S. 375, :i90 (1962). 
~ 4 It hns bren held that "infnmous" puniHhmrnts includr con-
finement ::~t hnrd lnbor, United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 
(1922); incnrccrntion in a penitentinry, Mackin v. United States, 
117 U. S. 348 (1886); and imprimnmrnt for more than a year. 
Barkman \'.Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592 (CA5), cert. demrcl, 332 U.S. 
816 (1G47). Feel. Rule Crim. Proc. 7 (n) hns rodified the~e hold-
ing~: "An offen~e which mny be puni~hrd by death shall be prose-
cuted by indictment. An offen~e whirh mny be punishrrl by im-
pri~onment for a term exceeding one ycnr or at hard labor shall 
be pro~ecutrd b~· indictment, or if indictment is waived, it may be 
prosecuted by information. Any other offen~e may be proserutrd by 
indictment or information." 
2 " Although indictment by grand jury is not pnrt of the due 
prore~s of law guaranteed to State criminnl defendants by the Four-
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inquire into the existence of possible criminal conduct 
and to return only well-founded indictments, its im·esti-
gativc powers arc necessarily board. "It is a grand in-
quest. a body with po"·ers of investigation and inquisi-
tion, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited 
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the 
probable result of the investigation, or by doubts 
whether any particular individual will be found 11roperly 
subject to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). Hence the grand jury's 
authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic. id., 
at 279-281, but essential to its task. Although the 
powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are 
subject to the supervision of a judge. the long standing 
principle that "the public has a right to every man's 
evidence," except for those persons protected by a con-
stitutional, common law, or statutory privilege, United 
States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. 
United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932); 8 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence § 2192 (McSuughton cd. 1961), is particularly 
applicable to grand jury procecdings.20 
teenth Amendment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), a 
recent study reveals that 32 States re(]uire that certain kinds of crim-
inal prosecutions be initiated by indictment. Spain, The Grand 
Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 1 Am. Crim. L. Q. 119, 126-142 
(1963). In the 18 States in which the prosecutor may proceed by 
information, the grand jury is retained as an alternative means of 
invoking the criminal process and as an investigative tool. Ibid. 
26 Jerrmy Bentham vividly illustrated this maxim: 
"Arr mrn of the first rank and considrration, are mrn high in officr, 
men whose time is not lc~s valuable to the public than to them-
sclves ,-are such men to be forced to (]nil their business, their fnnc-
tions, and what is more than all, their pleasu re, at the beck of rvery 
idle or mahcious adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty 
cause? Yes, as far as it i:c: necessary,-they and everybody! ... 
Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the 
Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach while a 
chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a 
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A number of States have provided newsmen a stat-
utory imvilege or vary-ing breadth/7 but ihe majority 
h"aVe not done so, and none ha-;"becn provided by federal 
statute. 28 Until now the only testimonial privilege for 
unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Con-
stitution is the Fifth Amendment privile e a ainst com---pelled self-incrimination. e are as e to create another 1 
b~ inter12retmg the First Amendment to grant newsmen 
a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. 
halfpennyworlh of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-
woman were to think proper to call upon them for their evidence, 
could they refuse it? No, most certainly." 4 The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham 320 (Bowring c:>d. 1843). 
In United States v. Bun·, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (Cir. Ct. D. Va. 1807) 
No. 14,692d), Chief Just ice Marshall, sitting on Circuit, OJ)ined 
that in prOJ)('r circumstances a subpoena could be issued to the 
President of the United States. 
27 Thus far, 17 States have provided some type of statutory pro-
tection to a newsman's collfiden tial sources: 
"Ala. Code Recompiled Til. 7, § 370 (1960); Alaska Stat. § 09.25.-
150 (1967, 1970 Cum. Supp.); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (1969 
Supp.); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1964); Cal. Evid. Code Ann. 
§ 1070 (West 1966); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. § 421.100 (1969); La. Rev. Stat. § 45:1451-54 (1970 Cum. 
Supp); Md. Ann. Code Art. 35, § 2 (1971); Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§ 28.945 (1) (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. Tit. 93, ch. 601-2 
(1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. ~ 48.087 (1969); N. J. Stat. Ann. Tit. 2A 
ch. 84A, § 21, 29 (Supp. 1969); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (1953, 
1967 Rev.); N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney 1970); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.12 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 28, § 330 
(1958, 1970 Cum. Supp.)." 
28 Such legislation has been introduced, however. See, e. g., 
S. 3352, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1970); H. R. 16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 1851, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H. R. 8519, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1963); H. R. 7787, 88th Cong., 1st Se::;s. (1963); S. 965, 86th 
Cong., M Sess. (1959); H. R. 355, 86th Cong., 1st Scss. (1959). 
For a general annlysis of proposed congressional legi~lation, see 
Staff of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Scss., 
The Ncw~man's Pri1·ilegc (Comm. Print 1966). 
?~ 
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overnment, an t 1e r ur la s an im )Ortant, 
constltutiona y mandated role in th' )ro ess. n t 1e 
recorc s now e ore us, we perceive 110 basis for holding 
that the public interest in law enforcement and in en-
suring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to 
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on 
news gathering which is said to result from insisting 
that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant 
questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury 
investigation or criminal trial. 
This conclusion itself involves no restraint on what 
newspapers may publish or on the type or quality 
~DThe crrntion of nrw tr~timoninl pri,·ilq~rR hns been mrt with l 
di;f:1\'or by commrntntor" sincr surh pri,·ilrgcs obstruct the ~rnrrh 
for truth. Wigmore conclrmn~ such j)fi,·ilrgrs n~ "~o mnny clrrogn-· 
1ion.· from :1 po"iti\·e grnrraJ rule rthnt e\·cryone i~ obfigntrcl 10 
trstif~· whrn proprrly summonrd]" nne! n~ "ob~tactcr"l to the nd-
mini"t.mtion of ju~ti<"r." S Wigmorr, On E,·idcncc 70, 73 (McNnugh-
ton rd. 1961). His rritirism th;tt "all privileges of exemJ)tion from 
th-is general duty are eX('('ptional :me! nre thrrrfore to be cli~rouu­
trnanrrd," id., at 73 (emph:1"is in originnl) has been fr('(]tH'ntly 
crhord. Morgan, "Forewnrd," Model Code of EYidcnrc 22-30 
( 1942); Clw frr, C:owrnmrnt nne! J\b~s Comnmnirntion~ 496-497 
(19.t7): ABA Commiitrr on Impro,·rmrnt~ in thr L11w of EYidence, 
Report, 6~ A. n. A. Rq)ortH 595 (1938); McCormick, On Evid<'nce 
150 (1972); Ch:1frr, "PriYilrgrd Commnnirntion~: Ts .Ju::'tirc Srn·rd 
or Ob~tmrted by Closing fhr Doctor'R Mouth on the Witur"s Stand?," 
52 Yah' L. J. 607 (194:~); Ladd, "Pri1·ilr~r~," 1969 L:nv and th~ 
Social Order 555, 556 (1960); 58 Am . .Jur., '\Yitne~~es §54() (19.t8); 
97 C . .J. S., Witne,~r8 § 259 (1957); McMann v. Srcurities and E:r-
change Commission, 87 F. 2d 377, 378 (CA2 1938) (L. Hanel , J.). ~ 
NC'ithrr thr ALI'~ .Model Codr of E1·idcnce (1942) , the National 
Confrrence of tomn11~~10ners on Uniform State Lnws' Uniform Rulr~ 
of Evidence (1053) , nor the Propo~rd Rulrs of Eviclrncr for th~ 
United States Courts and MngistrntC'~ (rev. rd . 1971) hnve included 
n. newsman's priYilege. 
tC • 
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of information reporters may seek to acquire, nor does 
it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships be-
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forbidden to all other persons. To assert the contrary 
proposition 
"is to answer it, since it involves in its very state-
ment the contention that the freedom of the press 
is a freedom to do· wrong with impunity, and im-
plies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge 
·Of those governmental duties upon the performance 
of which the freedom of all, including that of the 
press, depends . . . it suffices to say that, however 
complete is the right of the press to state public 
things and discuss them, that right, as every other 
right enjoyed in human society, is subject to the 
restraints which separate right from wrong." Toledo 
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419-
420 (1918).'10 
Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that-I 
the First Amendment protects a newsman's agreement 
to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evi-
dence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write 
about crime than to do something about it. Insofar -as any re )Orter in these cases underto k not to reveal 
or testif abo the cr ne e itnessed, his claim of 
priv1 ege under the First mendment presents no sub-
stantial question. Congress, state le islatures or state 
courts under their o;n-oonstitutwns may arrive at if-
ferent views, bul for the purpose of federal constitution.al 
aajudication, we do not consider the crimes of news 
80 Tho holding in this case involved a construction of the Con-
tempt Act 'of 1831, 4 Stat. 487, which permitted ·ummary trial of 
contempts "so ncar [to the court] as to obstruct the administration 
of justice." The Court held that the Act required only that the con-
duct have "a tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of 
judicial duty." 247 U. S., at 419. This view was overruled and the 
Act given a much narrower reading in Nye v. United States, 313 
U. S. 33, 47-52 (1941). See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 205-
206 (1968). 
[~ 
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sources any less reprehensible and threatening to t~ 
pubhc mterest when witnessed by a reporter than when 
· they are not. 
"There ""';emain those situations where a source is not 
engaged m criminal conduct b~ has information sug-
gesting Iilegal conduct by ot~ers. Newsmen frequently 
receive informatiOn from such sources pursuant to a 
tacit or express agreement to withhold the source's 
name and suppress any information that the source· 
wishes not published. Such informants presumably 
desire anonymity in order to avoid being entangled 
as a witness in a criminal trial ·or grand jury investiga-
tion. They may fear that disclosure will threaten their 
job security or personal safety or that it will simply 
result in dishonor or embarrassment. 
As we have indicated, the argument is that if a source 
is identified, he and similar informants having evidence 
of wrongdoing will no longer reveal information to the 
press and that although forcing reporters to testify 
may help or even be crucial in specific cases, the public 
and law enforcement will both be deprived of informa-
tion furnished by confidential sources in the future. The 
) 
point is urgently pressed; but as a constitutional 
matter, the interest in fair and effective law enforce-
ment cannot be so easlly overridden. We decline to· I 
construe the First Amendment to protect agreemenj:,s 
by re orters to conceal facts relevant to the investi a-
tion of crime by gran iuries. 
The argument that the flow of news will be dimin-
ished by compelling reporters to aid the grand jury 
in a criminal investigation is not irrational, nor are· 
the records before us silent on the matter. But we 1 
remain unclear how often and to what extent informers 
are actually deterred from furnishing information when 
newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury. The 
available data indicates that some newsmen rely a great 
~~ 
~~..,.J . 
~ c..,..,., ..... 
~~ 
~~ 
~.._,.; • .t 
~~~ 
~"'MI4o .......... ~ 
___ __..,/ 
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deal on confidential sources and that some informants 
are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and 
may be silenced if it is held by this Court that, ordi-
narily, newsmen must testify pursuant to subpoenas,"t 
but the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would 
bel!;_ sig1;ificant constriction ol the flow of news to the 
PJlblic if this Court reaffirms the prior common law 
and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obliga-
tions of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect 
of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to 
make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and 
to a great extent speculative. ~ 2 It would be difficult 
to canvass the views of the informants themselves; 
surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinio11s 
of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed 
in the light of the professional self-interest of the in-
tervimvees. ~3 Reliance by the press on confidential in-
:; , Rrspondcnt Ca ldwe ll nttachcd a numbrr of nfTidavit s from 
prominrnt newsmen to hi.;; initia l motion to quash which detail the 
cxpcricncrs of such journali~t s nftcr they hn vc been sub]1ocnnrd. R ., 
[) t 22- 61. 
R2 Cf., e. g., thr rc~ ult s of n stud~' conduetrd hy Gur~ t & Stanzler , 
which npprnrs as an appendix to thrir article, "The Constitutional 
Arf.!ument for New~mrn Conernling thrir Somcr~ , " 64 Nw. U. L. 
R ev. 18, 57 (1969). A numbrr of editor~ of daily J1cwspn]1Crs of 
Yarying circulation were asked the quc~tion , "Excluding one- or 
t\ro-srntenre gossip i1rm~ , on 11H' m·cragr how many stori es bnsed 
on information rccrin•d in confidrncr nrc published in your paper 
rnch ~~enr? Vrry rough e~timat e ." Answrrs varied ~ignifir::tnl'ly e. g. , 
"Virtually innumerable," Tucson Dnily Citizrn (41 ,969 daily circ.), 
"Too mnny to rrmembrr," Los Angelo~ Hcarld-Examiner (718,221 
daily eire.) , "Ocrasionnlly," Dcm·er Post (252,084 daily circ .), 
"R arely" CJc,·elancl Pla in Drnlrl· (370 ,499 daily circ.) , "V cry rare, 
some politics," Orrgon .Journnl (146,403 daily circ. ) . This study did 
not purport to measure tho cxtrnt of dctrrrenre of informant s caused 
by subpoenas to the ])]'C'S~. 
33 In his Press Subpoenas : An Empirical and Legal Ana ly~ i s 6- 12 
( 1971), Prof. Blasi di~cnsscs these methodological problems. Prof. 
Blasi's survey found that slightly more than half of the 975 re-
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formants docs not mean that all such sources 'vill in 
fact dry up because of the later possible appearance 
of the newsman before a grand jury. The reporter, 
of course, may uevcr be called and if he objects to 
testifying, the prosecution may not insist. Also, the 
relationship of many informants to the press is a sym-
biotic one which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by 
the threat of subpoena: quite often, such informants 
arc members of a minority political or cultura.l group 
which relies heavily on the media. to propagate its views, 
publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public. 
Moreover, grand juries conduct secret proceedings. 
and law enforcement officers arc themselves experienced 
in dealing with informers and ha.ve their own methods 
for protecting them without interference with the effec-
tive administration of justice. There is little before 
us indicating that informants whose interest in avoid-
ing exposure is that it may theaten job ersonal safety 
or peace of mind, would in fact, be in a. ·worse posi-
tion, or would think they would be, if they risked 
placing their trust in public officials as well as re-
porters. W c doubt if the informer who prefers anonym-
ity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence of 
crime will always or very often be deterred by the pros-
pect of dealing with those public authorities character-
istically charged with the duty to protect the pubil.c 
interest as well as his. 
Accepting the fact, however, that a11 undetermined 
number of informants not themselves implicated in crime 
"·ill nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk 
to newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter 
~,JJ 
porters questionlsa icl that they relied on regular confidential sources 
for at least 10% of their stories. !d., at 21. Of this group of re-
porters, only 8% were able to say with some certainty that their 
profe~sionnl functioning lwei been adversely affected by tho threat 
of subpoena; another 11 % were not certain whether or not they had 
been adversely affected. !d., at 53. 
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m an official investigation , ''"e cannot accc11t the 
argument that the public interest in possible future 
news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources 
must take precedence over the public interest in pursu-
ing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the pre~~ 
by informants and in thus deterring the commission of 
such crimes in the future. 
We note first that th~_yrivilege claimed is that of the ( 
reporter, not the informant, and that if the authonties 
independently identify the informant; neither his own 
reluctance to testify nor the objection of the newsm.an 
would shield him from grand jury inquiry, whatever 
the impact on the flow of news or on his future useful-
ness as a secret source of information. More impor-
tant, it is obvious that agreements to conceal information 
relevant to commission of crime have very little to rec-
ommend them from the standpoint of public policy. 
Historically, the common law recognized a duty to raise 
the "hue and cry" and report felonies to the authori-
ties.a4 Misprision of a felony- that is, the conceal-
ment of a felony clwhrch a man knows but never assented 
to so as to become either principal or accessory," 4 Black-
stone, Commentaries, c. 9, *121 (Lewis eel. 1902), 
was a common law crime.a" The first Congress passed 
a statute, 1 Stat. 113, as amended, 35 Stat. 1114, 62 
s• See Statute of WestminiRter the First , 3 Edw. I , c. IX, at 43 
(1275) ; Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I , c. VI, at 114-115 (1285); 
Sheriffs Act of 1887, 50 & 51 Viet ., c. 55, § 8 (1) ; 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, c. 21 , f:·293-·X·295 (LewiR ed. 1902) ; 2 Holdsworth , History 
of English Law 80-81, 101-102 (3d cd. 1927) ; 4 ibid., at 521- 522. 
35 See, e. g., Scrape's Case, 3 Co. Inst. 36 (1415) ; R ex v. Cowper, 
5 Mod. Rep. 206, 87 E. R. 611 (1696); Proceedings under a Special 
Commission for the County of York, 31 Stat. , Tr. 969 (1813); Sykes 
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 3 W. L. R. 371 (19Gl). Sec also 
2 R.ich. III, c. 22 (-); Art 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11 (1512) . 
-
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·Stat. 684, which is still in effect, defining a federa.l crime 
of misprision: 
"Whoever, having knowledge of the actual com-
mission of a felony cognizable by a court of the 
United States, conceals and does not as soon as 
possible make known the same to some judge or 
other person in civil or military authority under 
the United States shall be [guilty of misprison] ." 
18 U. S. C. § 4. 
This statute has been construed, however, to require 
both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of 
concealment or participation. Bratton v. United States, 
73 F. 2d 795 (CAlO 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38 
F. 2d 515, 516 (Mass. 1930), aff'd on other grounds, 
281 U. S. 613 ( 1930); United States v. N onnan, 391 
F. 2d 212 (CA6 1968), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 1014 
(1968); Lancey v. United States, 356 F. 2d 407 (CA9), 
cert. denied, 385 U. S. 922 (1966). But whatever the 
reach of the act, it is apparent from the statute, as 
well as from our history and that of England, that con-
cealment of crime and agreements to do so are not 
looked upon with favor. Such conduct deserves no· 
encom.iu.m and until now has carried no First Amend-
ment credentials. We decline at this juncture to con- \ 
strue the Amendment to denigrate the duty of the· 
citizen, whether reporter or informer, to respond to 
grand jury subpoena and answer relevant questions put 
to him. 
We are unimpressed with the argument that the free-
dom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment 
must place newsmen beyond grand jury subpoena in order 
to protect their right 1o publish only that part of the news 
their sources care to have the public read. Of course, 
the press may print or not print whatever news it 
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pleases, but the right to withhold news is not equiva-
lent to a First Amendment exemption from the ordi-
nary duty of all other citizens to furnish relevant 
information to a grand jury performing an important 
pu'lillc function. Private restraints on the flow of in-
formation have never before been accorded First Amend-
ment protection. As Mr. Jusbce Black aecla.red m 
another context, "Freedom of the Press from govern-
mental interference under the First Amendment does 
not sanction repression of that freedom by private in-
terests." Associated Press v. Um:ted States, 326 U. S. 
1' 20 ( 1945) . 
Neither arc we now convinced that a virtually im-
penetrable constitutional shield, beyond legislative or 
judicial control, sh,guld be forged to protect a private 
system of informers operated by the press to re )0 ·t on 
crmuna conduct, a system t.1at vYoulc be unaccountable 
to me public, would pose a threat to the citizen's justi-
fiable expectations of privacy, and would equally pro-
. teet well-intentioned informants and those who for pay 
or other\\'ise betray their trust to their emplo er or 
assoCia. es. 1c pu 1c 1roug 1 1 s e ectcd and appointed 
law eniorcemcnt officers regularly utilizes informers, and 
in proper circwnstances may assert a priYilege against 
disclosing the identity of these informers. But 
"The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance 
and protection of the public interest in effective 
law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the ob-
ligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge 
of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement 
officials and, by preserving their anonymity, en-
courages them to perform that function." Rovario 
v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 59 ( 1957). 
Such informers enjoy no constitutional protection, how-
ever. Their testimony is a.vailable to the public when 
desired by grand juries or at criminal trials; their iden-
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tity cannot be concealed from the defendant when it 
is critical to his case. Rovario v. United States, supra; 
McCray v. Illinm·s, 386 U. S. 300, 310 ( 1067); Smith v. 
Illino·is, 390 U. S. 120, 131 (1968); Alford v. United 
States, 282 U. S. 687, 693 (1931). Clearly, this system 
is not impervious to control by the judicia.ry and the 
decision \Yhether to unmask an informer or to continue 
to profit by his ano11ymity is in public. not private, 
hands. We think that it should remain there and that 
public authorities should retain the options of either 
insisting on the informer's testimony relevant to the 
prosecution of crime or of seeking the benefit of further 
information that his exposure might prevent. 
We arc admonished that refusal to provide a Firs ·~ 
Amendment reporter's privilege will undermine the free- " 
dom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But 
this is not the lesson history teaches us. As n;t;i 
preVwusly, the common law recognized 1;0 such priv-
ilege. and the constitutional argument \Vas not even 
asserted until 1958. From the beginning of our coun-
try the press has operated without constitutional pro-
tection for press informants. There is nothing persuasive 
before us indicating that the free press has so far suf-. 
fered or that either reporters or their sources have 
found the duty to respond to subpoenas an unaccept-
able deterrent. To the contrary, t 1e )ress has :flour-
i~hed and does not seem to have found the ex1s m 
---~ -,..(..0 
aa Though the con~( itution:1l argument for a newsman's privilege 
has been put forward very recently, newsmen have contended for a 
number of years thnt surh n privilege wa::: dc~irable. See, e. (f. , Sic-
bert & Ryniker, Editor and Publi~hcr 36-37 (Sept. 1, 1934) ; Bird 
& Men ·in, The New~papcr and Society 567 (1942) . The firBt news-
man's privilege s1n tute wa~ enacted by Maryland in 1896, and cur-
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It is said tha.t currently press subpoenas have multi-
plied,37 that mut~l ClTstrust and tenswn between press 
ana:-officialdom have increased, that reporting styles 
have changed and that there is now more need for con-
fidential sources, particularly 'vVherc the press seeks 
news about minority cultural and political groups or dis-
'sident organizations suspicious of the law and police 
officials. These developments, even if true, arc treach-
erous grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the 
First Amendment fastening a nationwide rule on courts, 
grand juries and prosecuting officials everywhere. The 
obligation to testify in response to grand jury subpoenas 
will not affect those sources not involved with crim-
inal conduct and without information relevant to grand 
jury investigations. And for those who are in those 
special categories, we cannot hold at present that the 
Constitution places them either above the la>v or be-
yond its reach. 
We do not disregard those cases requiring the State's 
interest to be "compelling,'' or "paramount," see cases 
cited, n. 16, supra., to justify even indirect burdens on 
First Amendment rights, nor those cases insisting that 
the infringement of protected rights be no broader 
than necessary to achieve the States' valid goal, see 
cases cited, n. 17, supra. As we have indicated, the in-
vestigation of crime by the grand jury implements a 
fundamental governmental role of securing the safety 
of the person and property of the citizen/8 and it ap-
37 A list of recent subpoeEas to the news media io; contained in the 
appendix to the brief of amicus New York Times in No. 70-57. 
38 Cf. State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N. W. 2d 93 (1971), 
in which a grand jmy was investigating the August 24, 1970, bomb-
ing of Sterling Hall on the University of Wisconsin l\1adi~on campus. 
On August 26, 1970, an "underground" newspaper, the l\I::tdiHon 
Kaleidoscope, printed a front-page story entitled "The Bombers Tell 
Why and What Next-Exclusive to the Kaleidoscope." An editor 
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pears to us that calling reporters to give testimony in ( 
the manner and for the reasons that other citizens are 
called "bears a reasonable relationship to the achieve-
ment of the governmental purpose asserted as its justi-
fication." Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 525 
( 1960). If the test is that the Government "convinc-
ingly show a substantial relation between the informa-
tion sought and a subject of overriding and compelling 
state interest," Gibson v. Florida Investigation Com-
mittee, 371 U. S. 539, 546 (1963), it is quite apparent 
(1) that the State has the necessary interest in ex-
tirpating the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assas-
sination attempts on the President, and in preventing 
the community from being disrupted by violent dis-
orders endangering both persons and property; and 
(2) that, based on the: stories Branzburg and Caldwell 
worte and Pappas' admitted conduct, the grand juries 
called these reporters as they would other&-because it I 
was likely that they could supply information to help 
the Government determine whether illegal conduct had 
occurred and, if it had, whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to return an indictment. 
11 
~ /, 
Similar considerations dispose of the reporters' claims ~ ' 
that preliminary to requiring their grand jury appear-
ance, the State must show that a crime has been com-
.,..._,_. - --...-
of the Kaleidoscope was subpornaed, appeared, asserted his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, was given immunity, 
and then pleaded that he had a First Amendment privilege against 
disclosing his confidential informants. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
rejected his claim and upheld his contempt sentence: "[A]ppellant 
faces five very narrow and specific questions, all of which arc founded 
on information which he himself has already volunteered. The pur-
pose of these questions is very clear. The need for answers to them 
is 'overriding,' to say the least. The need for these answers is nothing 
short of the public's need (and right) to protect itself from physical 
attack by apprehending t lw perpetrators of such attack~." 49 WiH .. 
2d, at 183 N. W. 2d, at -. 
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mitted and that they possess relevant information not 
available from other sources. The role of the grand 
jury as an important instrument of effective law en-
forcement necessa.rily includes an investigatory func-
tion with re~11jfil1etli"er 'a:~rime has 
been conu nitted and who committed it. T o t his end 
it "'i;1ust call ,;tt7lesses, in the manri'er best suited to 
perform its task. A grand jury investigation of a crime 
within its jurisdiction may be triggered by tips, rumors, 
evidence proferred by the prosecutor, or the personal 
knowledge of the grand jurors. Costello v. United 
States, supra, at 362. It is only after the grand jury has ( 
examined the evidence that a determination of '.vhcther 
the proceeding will result in an illdictment can be made: 
"It is impossible to conceive that in such cases \\ 
the examination of wit.nesses must be stopped until 
a basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred. 
'"hen the very object of the examination is to af:ccr-· 
tain who will be indicted." Hale v. Henkel, 201 
U. S. 43, 65 (1906). 
Sec also H endTicks v. United States, 223 U. S. 178 ( HH2) ;· 
BlaiT v. United States, supm, at 282-283. 
On the records before us, there is no reason what-
soever to believe that these gra~cl Junes a will probe 
at will and without relation to existing need," DeGTegoTy 
v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U. S. 825, 
829 (1066), or to hold that these reporters, any more 
than other citizens, should be excused from furnishing 
m7 mfori!!,.atwn they "Tiave that may help the grand 
jury in arnving at its initial determinations. To hold 
otherwise would but frustrate a.n. important public func-
tion in pursuit of wha.t appear to be elusive and specula-
tive ends. 
The privilege cla.imed here is conditional, not abso- I 
lute; given the suggested preliminary showings and 
compelling need, the reporter would be required to tes-
70-R5. 70-94, & 70-57-0PINION 
BHANZBURG v. HAYES 37 
tify. Presumably, such a rule would reduce the in-
stances in which reporters could be required to appear, 
but predicting in advance "·hen and i11 what circum-
stances they could be compelled to do so would be 
difficult. If newsmen's confidential sources aJ·c as sensi-
tive as they are claimed to be, the pro,.pect of being 
unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation 
justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem.~9 For them, it would appear that only an absolute 
privilege would suffice. 
We arc unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long 
and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. 
The administration of a constitutional newsman's riv-
ilegc wou present practical an conceptual difficulties 
of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be uecessary 
to del!nc those categories of newsmen who qualified 
for the pnvliege, a questiOnable procedure in light of 
the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the 
right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon pflper 
or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metro-
~n "Undrr thr rn~r-by-r·ll~C mrthod of clr1·rlopinp; rulr~. it will be 
difficult for potential informants and rrportrr~ to prrdirt \\'hethrr 
tr~timon.1· will be rompellrd sincr the derision will tum on the judge's 
ad hoc a~~C'~8mcnt in diffrrent fnrt setting~ of 'importanrr' or 'rrle-
vnnrc' in relation to thr frre prr~s intrrr~t. A 'generrd' drterrrnt 
e!Tert is likely to m;;ult. Thi~ type of efTect stemH from the Yague-
ness of the tr:-t~ and from the unrNUtinty attrnding their npplication. 
For ex:tmplr, if n reportrr·~ information goes to thr 'heart of thr mat-
ter' in 8itu:1tion X, :motlwr rrporter and informant who subsrquentl~r 
arc in Situation Y ll'i!lnot know if 'henrt of thr matter rule X' will 
he extended to thrm, and detrrrrnce will thereby re~ult. LC:'a1·ing 
subst:tntial discretion with judp;rs to delineate those 'situntions' in 
which rult's of 'rrleYnnce' or 'importance' apply would therefore 
serm to undrrminr Rignifirnntly the d'frctivene~R of a rrporter-
informer privilrgr." Noll', Rrporters and Their Sources: The Con-
Rtitutional Right. to n Confidential RrlntionRhip, SO Ynle L. J. 317, 
341 (1970). For ::m ex:1mplc of this ad hoc balancing, see In re 
Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (ND Cal. 1970). 
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politan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposi-
tion methods. Freedom of the press is a "fundamental 
personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers and 
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and 
leaflets . . . . The press in its historic connotation com-
prehends every sort of publication which affords a ve-
hicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of 
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450, 452 (1938). See also Mills 
v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966); Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 111 (1943). The informa-
tive function asserted by representatives of the organized 
press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, 
political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and 
dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately 
assert that he is contributing to the flow of informa-
tion to the public, that he relies on confidential sources 
of information, and that these sources wil be silenced 
if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.40 
In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed to 
testify, the courts would also be embroiled in prelim-
inary factual and legal determinations with respect to 
whether the proper predicate had been laid for the re-
porters' appearance: Is there probable cause to believe 
40 Such a privilege might be claimed by groups that set up news-
papers in order to engage in criminal activity and be insulated from 
grand jury inquiry, regardles of Fifth Amendment grants of im-
munity. It might appear that such "sham" newspapers would be 
easily distinguishable, yet the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits 
courts from inquiring into the content of expression, except in cases 
of obscenity or libel, and protects speech and publications regnrd-
less of their motivation, orthodoxy, truthfulness, timeliness, or taste. 
N ew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269-270 (1964) ; 
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959); 
Winters v. N ew York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948); Thoma.s v. Collin.s, 
323 U. S. 516, 537 (1945). By nffording a privilrge to some organs 
of communication but not. to others, courts would inevitably b(} 
di ~:;criminating on the basis of content. 
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a crime has been committed? Is it likely that the 
reporter has useful information gained in confidence? 
Could the grand jury obtain the information elsewhere?' 
Is the official interest sufficient to outweigh the claimed 
privilege? 1 
Thus, in the end, the courts would be inextricably 
involved in distinguishing between the value of enforc-
ing different criminal laws. By requiring testimony 
from a reporter in investigations involving some crimes 
but not in others, they would be making a value judg-
ment which a legis,lature had declined to make, since 
in each case the criminal law involved would represent 
a considered legislative judgment, not constitutionally 
suspect, of what a conduct is liable to criminal prosecu-
tion. The task of judges, like other officials outside 
the legislative branch, is not to make the law but to 
uphold it in accordance with their oaths. I 
We decline, therefore, in the face of the evidence 
now presented, to embark on a course which will entail 
the drawing of ~ssamer distinctions unsuitable for con-
stitutional adjud1cabon. Resolution and management 
of this problem, if as serious as represented to us, are 
better left to t branches of the Government. At 
era level and with infinitely superior ools com-
prehensively to survey the issue, Congress has much 
more freedom to fashion standards and rules as narrow 
or broad as deemed necessary to addres~s the evil discerned 
and, equally important, to re-fashion those rules as 
experience from time to time may dictate. There is 
also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within :First 
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in 
light of the conditions and problems with respect to 
prosecution and press in their own areas. It goes with-
out saying, of course, that we arc po,verless to erect 
any bar to state courts responding in their own way 
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and construing their own constitutions so as to recog-
llize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute. 
In addition, there is much force in the pragmatic I 
view that the press has at its disposal powerful mecha-
nisms of communication and is far from helpless to 
protect itself from harassment or substantial harm. 
The legislative solution is open to it, and in any 
event, the press can be expected to hold its own with 
local prosecutors, state or federa1. 41 Furthermore, if 
what the newsmen urge in these cases is true-that law 
enforcement cannot hope to gain and may suffer from 
subpoenaing newsmen before grand juries-prosecutors 
will be loath to risk so much for so little. Thus, at 
the federal level the Attorney General has already 
fashioned a set of rules for federal officials in connec-
tion with subpoenaing members of the press to testify 
before grand juries or at criminal trials. ~ 2 These rules 
~ 1 This powrr i~ rrco~nizrd in numrrou~ nphoriRms, e. fl. 
Two newsmrn upsP.t a DA, 
With a srnndnlous rxpo~r, 
Thr~· lost 011 the First 
And wrre jnilrd unrrvrr~ed, 
But the prr~s put tbr DA awn)·. 
(Gur!;;t & Stanzlrr. Thr Con~titutionnl Ar~umrnt for New~mrn Con-
rrnling Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 18, 48 n. 148 (1969); 
"Three hostile newspnprr~ nrr morr to he frnrrd thnn n thou~nnd 
ba~•onet8" (:1ttributrcl to Napolron, Ad:nn~. Book of Quotntions 65Z 
(1052)). 
·~The "Guiclrlinrs for flubpoems to t hr N rws l\Iedin" wrre fir~t 
nnnounrrd in a f'prrrh by thr Attorney Grnrrnl on Augu~t 10, 1970, 
nncl then "·rre rxprcssed in Drpnrtmrnt of .Tu~tire l\1emo No. 69Z 
(8rptrmber 2, 1970), whic·h wns srnt to all Unitrd St:1trs nttornrys 
by the As~istnnt Attomry General in chnr~r of thr Criminnl Division. 
The Guidelines state th~1t "The Depnrtment of .Tu~tiee rrro~nizrs 
that eompul~ory prore~s in sonw rirrum.·tnnre~ may hnvr n limiting 
efTect on the exerci~e of First Amrndment ri~hts . In detrrmining 
whethrr to requr~t i~snam'c of a subpornn to 1 he press, the a ppronch 
in e\·ery rn~e mu~t be to weight thnt limit in~ rffrct ngninst the public 
interest to be srrved in the fair administrntion of justice" and that 
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are a major step in the direction petitioners desire to 
move. They may prove wholly sufficient to resolve the 
bulk of disagreements and controversies between press 
and federal officials. 
Finally, as we have earlier indicated, n,ews gathering I 
is not without its First Amendment xotect10ns, a.nd 
gran JUry investigations if instituted or conducted other 
than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues 
for resolution under the First Amendment: ~ Official 
harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes 
of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relation-
ship with his news sources would have no justification. 
Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas 
to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will for-~ 
get that grand juries must operate within the limits of 
the First Amendment as well as the Fifth. 
III 
We turn , therefore, to the disposition of the cases be-
fore us. From what we have said, It necessarily follows 
that the decision in United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57, 
"Tho Department of Justice docs not consider the pre~s 'an investi-
gative arm of the government.' Therefore, aU rmsonable attempts 
should bo made to obtain information from non-press sources before 
there is any con8iderntion of subpomaing tho pre~s ." The Guidelines 
pro,·ide for ncgotial ions with the press and require the express author-
ization of the Attorney General for such subpoenas. Tho principles 
to bo applied in authorizing Ruch ubpoonas arc slated to be whether 
there is "sufficient reason to believe that tho information sought 
[from the journalist] is essential to a successful investigation," and 
whether the Government has unsuccessfuly attempted to obtain the 
information from ::dterna tiYe non-pres:; sourct's. The Guidelines pro-
vide, however, thnt in "emergencies and other unusual situations," 
subpoenas may be issued which do not exactly conform to the 
Guidelines. 
1 3 Cf. Younger v. Ilan·is, 401 U.S. 37, 49, 53-54 (1971). 
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must be reversed. If there is no First Amendment privi-
lege to reiuse to answer the relevant and matenal u"es-
tions as {eel during a goo -fait 1 grand jury investiga_lion, 
then it is a for1wri true that there is no pnvilege to 
refuse to appear before such a grand JUry until the Gov-
ernment demonstrates some "compelling need" for a 
newsman's testimony. Other issues were urged upon us, 
but since they ·were not passed upon by the Court of 
Appeals, we decline to address them in the first instance. 
IV 
Th~ decisions in No. 70--85. Branzburg v. Hayes and 
Branzburg v. Meigs must be affirmed. Here, petitioner 
refused to answer questions that directly related to 
criminal conduct which he had observed and written 
about. The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that 
marihuana is defined as a narcotic drug by statute, Ky. 
Rev. Stat. § 218.010 (14), and that unlicensed posses-
sion or compounding of it was a felony punishable by 
both fine and imprisonment. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 218.210. ) 
It held that petitioner "saw the commission of the stat-
utory felonies of unlawful possession of marijuana and 
d1e unlawful conversion of it into hashish," in Branzburg 
v. ~' 461 S. W. 2d, at 346. Petitioner may be pre-
sumed to have observed similar violations of the state 
narcotics laws during the research he did for the story 
which forms the ba:sis of the subpoena in Branzburg v. 
Meigs. In both cases, if what petitioner wrote was true, I 
he had direct information to provide the grand jury 
concerning the commission of serious crimes. 
The only question presented at the present time in 
In the Maller of Paul Papp_as, No. 70--94, is whetJ;er 
pe~itioner Pappas must appear before the grand .JUr,Y to 
testifY pursnttnt to subpoena. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court characterized the record in this 
case as "meager," and it is not clear what petitioner will 
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be asked by the grand jury. It is not even clear that he 
w~ed to divulge inforr;:mtion rece1vea m conli-
dence. We affirm the decision of the Massachusetts Su-
pl::=~dicllg_ Court ana hold that pehtwner must ap-
pear efore the grand jury to answer the questions put to 
him, subject, of course, to the supervision of the presiding 
judge as to "the propriety, purposes, and scope of the 
grand jury inquiry and the pertinence of the probable 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ccmcurrtng~ ftu_ ~ 
~ ~ ~.~~~~~~ 
I add tbta brief statement to emphasize what seems to 
me to be the limited nature of the Court•s holdlng. The Court 
does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a 
grand jury, re without ccmstltutlonal rights wlth respect to the 
ptherlng of newa or ~guarding their aourc•. Certainly, 
we do net hold, as suggested tn the dissenting opinion, that 
state and federal authorities are free to "annex" the news mecUa 
as ''an Investigative arm of government. " The aollcltude 
repeatedly shown by this Court for Firat Amendment freedoms 
should be sufficient assurance against any such effort, even If 
~ 
me seriously believed that the media - free and 
untrammelled In the fullest sense of these terms - w•re 
not able to protect themselves. 
As Indicated In the cCilcludlng portion of the oplnlm, 
the Court states that no harassment of newsmen wUl be 
2. 
tolerated. If a newsman beUeves that the grand Jury Investigation 
1s not being ccmducted in good faith he i8 not without remedy. 
Jadeed, If the newsman 1a called upcm to gtve tnformatioo bearing 
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
mvestlgatlon, or lt he baa some other reaaoo to believe that his 
testimony implicates C<llfldenttal source relationships without 
a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to 
the Court on a mc:jlon to quash and an appropriate protection 
order may be tmtered. The asserted claim to prlv11ege should 
be judged oo ita facta by the strtldng of a proper balance between 
freedom ot the press and the obllgatton of aU citizens to give 
relevant testimony with respect to criminal ccmduct. The ba.Juce 
of these vital ccmstttutlonal and soeletal Interests oo a case-by-ease 
buts accords wlth the tried and traditional way of adjudlcattng 
aueh questlOD8. 
In short, the Court merely holds that a newsman (hasuMer 
%~ 
he a., te de:fiaed~ baa no testlmoolal priVilege as a matter of 
3. 
right under the Constitution. We do not hold that the protection 
of. the eourts 11 unavailable to newsmen under circumstances 
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protecttoo. 
